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Tti« 8«cr«t«ry«Gen«r«X i t appointed by the General Atscnbly 
ttpeR the reeoMaendetlon of the Seeuxlty Ceuiieilt the concurrence 
of the PoniaRiRt Meabers i t coBpultory* The logic behind thit 
proceditro of appolntnent i t liven that the Secretary«<3eneral mutt 
tn5«y ^^* confidence of the Big five to that he could play hit 
role effectively* Contefitentlyt the practice hat been for the 
Security Council to agree upon a candidate and for the Atsenbiy 
to appoint that candidate* In faett the Seeretary«General i t the 
Penanent Mead r^t* ^oninee". 
The Secretary-General i t the chief adninittrdtivc officer 
and also a h l ^ political officer of the lAnlted Nations. He i t 
assigned to play a central role as an adminletrator and as a peacd-
naker. He i t recognited as the leader and head of the ttaff of 
International Council of Servanta and i t i t bit prettigout duty 
to maintain the intamatlonal character, loyalty* independencet 
intsgrity and effectlvenett of the Secretariat. At i t in turn will 
help dininith world tention under his leadarthip, he i s expected 
to nanlfett Hiaalayan power in having tanction againtt Colonial 
Powart like the Pretoria regliDe and to face thorny crltietsai with 
4 smiling face. 
It i t the putpote of this ttudy to explain that the Secretary 
General, who i t eirpeeted to play surh a vital role should not be 
only »^owinee* of the Big Five. It i s neeettary In thr Interest of 
of intematicnal toeiety to «nend the provision (Article 97) 
11 
rt«trdln9 hit ippolntii@fit In such • •anncr that h« cc»uld function 
iMrlMsly, lnd«p«id«iUir» •ff«etlv«ly» •ffiel«ntly and Inpartially. 
For tha eeiiplatlon of Ihls woilt, I m h l ^ l y grataful to 
Or. Akhtar Majaad for auporvlaln^ tha antlra projaet fr«n Its 
boQlnninq* It t t dua to hit abta mA Intallactual QUldanea« eentant 
aneot2ra9aiiant and tmhatltant lialp that tha wexft eotild ba ecnplatad 
In tlma. My ^ratltuda to hi* It unboundad. 
I m thaidcftd alto to tha Faevlty nanbart* In parttcylar, 
profattor S«A»H« t l l fraal , Chalman« Profetter A,F« Uananlt 
Profatsor A.P. Shana and all nanbart of tha Dapartnant of Political 
Sdanca* Allgarh MutlUi Unlvartltyt Allgarh* for thalr aneouraQanant* 
I axpratt ny gratltuda alto to tha ttaf f of tha Maul ana Aiad 
Library, Altgazh Mutllai Unlvartlty* and tha Swinar Library, 
Dapertmant d Political Scienea, M »^ Atlgazh, for thalr atslstanca 
in finding out ralavant natarlatt* I m thankful alto to MrJiahboob 
Bag* «^o halpod no In nany wayt. 
July, i9ii (numn ISHH^) 
CHAPTBP I 
APPOINTMENT OF THE SBCRETARYUJHNBT^AL 
cHMnm 1 
Artiel* 97 of th« \M charter providat ttiat the "Secretary 
General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the 
reeoMMendatlon of the Seeurity Council •• 
The General Attoably decided, during the f irst session 
in 1946 that* %oth nomination and appointment should be diseussed 
at private meetinfiSt and a vote ••• i f taken, shall be by a seeret 
ballot•• The Assembly's Rules of Proeeduros aecordintly provide 
that nhe General Assembly shall eonsider the (Security Council's) 
recommendation and vote upon i t by secret ballot in private 
meeting* (Rule 142)* 
At San Francisco, the smaller states emphatically argued 
that the Seeretary«6enerel should be elected by the General 
Assembly done and i f the Security Council too i s allowed to 
participate the veto should not apply* This suggestion was not 
accepted and finally i t was agreed that the Secretary-General 
should be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendetion 
of the Security Council} the concurrence? of the peTman«nt members 
was made compulsory* No provision was made regarding the tersw of 
3 
office or ra^eligtbility. 
1. Ian Bromlie, B*«if ipg<««»ig iw Intemattonal Law (oxfords 
Clarendon Press* X9b7), p« 2¥* 
'• ?c^Uiraiiy^*t:gff^iOiirtis>f^^ 
3 . L-W. Goethrlsh, E. Hambro and A>P. Simons, S^ytg^pf rhf ^%M 
P r e l f ^ l 9 ^ ? P p P s ^ l 8 ? ^ ^ ^ ^ * ^ university 
Th« Ch«rt«r't provision on the ««thod of ^j^pointln^ Ui» 
S9tft*rfmQen%T9l ««t approved duo lo tho Intlstonco of the sajor 
powors. The BIQ Powers ei^hssized that i f the 8eeretary«-6eneral» 
«ho i s being vasted with Si^»ortant poiit isal raiponsibllltias» 
was to be affective in his role, he would naad to have the 
sonfidanee of the »aJor powers* Furtharttore* Uie Laagtie Secretary* 
4 
Genarai had bean appointed by the Cotincil «dth Assanbly's aoproval* 
Consa^entlyt the praatiee has been for the Security Council to 
agraa ^on a eandidata and for the Assambly to appoint that 
sandidata» so that the appointiBent i s in affect that of the 
pezMfient sienbers* noninaa. 
There i s no provision regardinf the tam of office of the 
8aeretary«0en«ral. At the San Francisco conference» the sponsoring 
Govamaents proposed that the Seeretary<>6^aral should be elected 
for a thraa»yaar ter« and be eligible for ra*eleetion. when the 
snailar states finally yielded on the Method of appointnent, 
accepting tha requlreownt of Security Council recowandation and 
paxnanent MeMbard can8urranaa» they insisted that the provision 
for a thraa»yaar teni be droppad* on the ground that a short*tex«' 
would stake the Se^etery*6enaral too dependant on the paiwanant 
siaubars. Ha would work in ^ e knowledga that his chances of 
A* Ibid.> p, M l . See also L.M, Goodrich. The united Wat ions in 
ffiancinS W^16 (Maw Yorkj Colunbia llnlvarill^ P # i s « 7 W l ) ;p.«5, 
5» D.lf. 6reig» international Law (Londont Butler worths* 1970) t 
p« St3, 
$• L*M. Goodrich* S. Haa6ro 9n6 A.P. Slnonst n* 3* p. 582. 
r«*«l«6tion would be small it h* IMTV to ineur th« dlsplaoturo 
T 
of an« of tile pofMonaiit «efab«ro» 
Tho Cii«rt«r beinq tlltfit ibout the texa of office of the 
SeeretarywGeiioral, in 19M, the Genaral Attoably adopted a 
resolutlcn which no»t Qovomt the texw of appotntnrfit• It provided 
that the first Secretary-Genaral should ho appointed for five years 
with the possibility of appointment being e|M»n at th^ ? end of that 
period for an additional five year texsi. Both the Assembly and 
the Security Council, however* wore l«ft froo to wodify the texw 
in fwtwra* The ^tsonbly also ttatod that owing to the eonfidantial 
nature of the office* no nenbar of the united Nations should offer 
a retiring Secretary-General a gcvozneisnt position imedlstely 
after retlrenont nor should the individual accept such a position 
if i t wore off ored. 
Under the said resolution the f irst Sacretary«<Senoral was 
appointed for a five year terv* the appointment to be open for 
renewal for a farther tanwre of five years* At the end of Trycfve 
t4e*s f irst terw of office in 1990» there was a eoaplote deadlock 
in the Security Council over the appointnent of the suMsssor* 
The So«lat Union refused to accept Lie on aocount of his handling 
of the Korean situation* while the United States would vote against 
any alternative Candida lo* In the absence of any recoenendation 
?• D*K« Greig« n« 9» p» 593. 
8, S.S« Goodspoed* ?^ a tf^ ^W^ fn^.fi^f^o^ fff |nteyBf||oT^a; 
Oraffilya^cyt (OnforiH Oxford university Press, 1 9 » ) , p. 344. 
from the Betttrlty tounetlt th« Genersl Ass«8ibly retoiv«4 that Lit 
should rMMln In office for a forthor porlod of thrta yo«rs* The 
Assoably took this ttop not by oiittn<iin9 tho torn of office laid 
devit in tho l f4i rosoiution« hut by roforeneo to the pflneiple of 
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•offoctivonots"* Tho Chortort to bo offocttvo, rot^irod tho 
unintozruptod oxoroise of the funetlono of tho Soeretary-Genoral. 
As the appointB^nt of the SecretariM3«noral In accordance with 
Article 97 was not po«$lble» tho Astosibly claiaied that i t possessed 
reslditary powers in relation to tho position of the Secretary-General 
and ender the Charter in genoral* l i i l le no such power was granted 
to the AssoB^ly by the Charter* i t could also be arQued that there 
was nothing In the Charter to prevent the Assenbly taking sueh a 
course* 
Lie was* however, not ro«4ioeilnated but continued tn office 
10 
for three years on an Assesdbly vote of 46«5<»8« However * Lle*s 
dynamic and soai«tlatos flaeboyant interpretation of his office was 
never fully accepted by th@ najor pooers* Generally speaking, the 
•ajor pot^rs faiK»urod a Secretaryu6eii«ral who was more e once mod 
with adninittratlve rother than dlplosatic natters* Lie described 
the dilesMM in this wsyt "everything i s in order as long as X agree 
with a particular Gevomsent* but as soon as I don*t « *Aren*t 
«fo paying you? Aren't you a servant of the Govemnent? You are 
9* D*W, Grelg, n« 5« p. 5t4. 
H.G* Nicholas, Ihe United 
(Now York) oxford University Press, 1999) 
10. Nations as f Political Institution 
» p« 9o» 
9 
U 
m «datntttr«tor* Mif do you UIk7* 
Th« tBUltr pOMertf on the othtr hand* ehMpiontd a aora 
•etiva and ttron^ar rola for th« Secrctary^Genaral, The ftrst 
Secret ary^anaral of the Lea t^te of Natlont» Sir Erie Drunmond, 
was str»«k bf the saae tltttation and eoweented at one point} 
<aiie anallar the country the «are trust It placed In the Secretary-
12 
General *. 
The U.S. Government Initially aupported Lie's election and 
viforously puthed for hit re-election. But the U.S. attitude toward 
Lie, «4ilch ini t ia l ly supported his election and vigorously supporUd 
hit r e a l action, fluctuated froB ttee to tine because of his effort 
on the Iranian question and the Berlin blockade Irritating the 
UnUed States* Hence, erlt lclsn of Tryvve Lie by the United States 
increased sharply with his attceipt to seat the Chinese ConiBunlst 
Qovemment In the United NstionS| but he becane the West'a "fair 
haired boy* during the Korean War» 
Tn February, 1991, the Soviet ftussla refused to r?coQnlxe 
Tryfve Lie as Secretary-General. They Insulted hlM personalTy, «id 
boycotted hl» socially and officially* The conduct, hoewver, nuch 
It night be deplored, was effective In forcing even Lie's warsiest 
supporters to realise that in consequence he was largely crippled 
U . R.I. Millar 
Oceana Publ IcK!onnfnc'!^^ifeS^ ^f^l^* ViP^9**fiy ('^ '^^  ^ ^^^ 
i2* Iky** p* 7. 
in hit endeavours at S«cr9tary<-6«naral to serve the full Interest 
of the Or^anltation and to retain the eonfldenee of al l mmbmr 
states . At the Sana ti«a l.ie*s position was further vieakened by 
development on another frcnt • attacks launehed on his Secretariat 
IroBi inside the United States. 
The refusal of the Soviet Union and other Coonunist states 
to recognize the validity of the General Assenbly't action and 
their coaplate boycott of Lie led hisi to the conviction that he 
should resigm in order that the full influence of the office miqht 
be exercised Ut the cause of peace* and with his family sailed 
home In May« 1953* 
The second Secret^y~ISaneral» Tmq HamnarskJold« on French 
proposal, was recomiended by the Security Cetmcil at a time nnh^ n 
the Big Two (the US'=l^  and the USA) were determined not to aoree 
with each other. His namtB was reecHsmended on March 31, 1993, and 
conflxsied by the General Assefbly bn April 7, 1993* Earlier, the 
US proposal In favour of Laster 3« Pearson was vetoed* Fortunately 
a struggle ahead was avoided and the French proposal was accepted 
by al l the Big Fivej the matter was brought to •'swift close•• 
During the f irst seven yaars of the tenure, the situations, 
fortunately, did not involve Haaniar^Jol.d in fundamental East-.west 
14. H.G. Nicholas, n« 10, p* 56. 
15. L«B^ . Goodrich, E« Hasbro and A.^?, Simons, n. 3 , p. 583. 
16. B.I. Miller, n. U» 
problMs. CoRfeqitently, th« S«cretary~Gafi«r«l tnioyad a daqrea 
of monoeuvreaftlllty, but when Haanardtjold mat hit daath in 19(1, 
ha had btaii tha obiact of violant attack by the Soviet Union 
oifer his conduct of tha UN aparation in tha C0R90* The attack 
vfat accoqpaniad by a d«nand that tha offlc@ of the Secretary. 
General be recognized to at to providet through ttsnicturril and 
procedural arrangenenta, the iiapartiality Mhieh the Soviet union 
17 
elaiflted, had been iwpotsibla to achieve in a single person. 
However, the Soviet Chalrwan, M.S. Khrutheh*v, stat ed on 
September 23» 1961: "Wa contlHer ft advineble to tot up. In the 
place of a Secretary^eneral «iho i s at present the interpreter 
and executor of the deeitiont of th*? General Asaeoibly and the 
Security Council, a collective executive organ of the United Ifatlont 
contitting of thra^ p«rtont each of mhoai would rspre^sont a certain 
group of ttatat** It waa known aa "Troika" ; three equal 
Saeretariet General • one representing the Eatt, one the West and 
one repretenting non«allgned countriat. CTroika* i t the Russian 
word for a carriage shown by three horset)* Tha basis for his 
daoiand was hit convittlon that "while thape are neutral countries, 
there are no neutral aiM"* 
A few days later (octobtr 3), the Scwiet leader attackac^ 
17« L*w. Goodrich, n» 4 , p. 87* 
I t , M. Watert, Jhe United Wationtt International Adminlttratlon 
(Nei» Yoiki The Vsetnillan Co., M?) , p. 161* 
19 • U Thant, View from the ^M (Londont David and rharles Mewton, 
1978)I p* 4. 
Ihe Secretary-General again, sayingt '^bveryone has heard how 
vlforously the Imparlallst eotsitrles dtfend tha attltuda of 
Mr* Hanmarikjold* It i s not clear «hose lnt«rasts ha Interprets 
20 
and exeeutest vliote * saint* he ls7" 
To avoid wlslnterpr^titlon, Khru^ehcv emphaftlzed, *T want 
to reaffirm that we do not trust Wr. Hammarricjolfl and cannot trust 
him. If he himself does not minster op enouoh couraoe to reslcin, 
so to say. In a chivalrous manner, then vie sh^ll draw th? n''C3S«!.iry 
conclusions from the slUiatlon ••« i t i s not prt^er for a man who 
has flouted elementary Justice to hold such an import^t post as 
that of Secratary^iJSenoral** 
Fortunately, Khrushchev's position had very l i t t l e support 
at the t i l t ed Nations* First of a l l , i t was obvious to most of the 
governnefits that the uncommlttsd or non»allfned nations could be 
divided into further sub-categoriss* For example, the pro. west em 
neutrality of country A could be contrasted with pro-Soviet 
Neutrality of country B and with the genuine neutrality of co&mtry C. 
The truth of such differing ideological orientations em^ out 
clearly at the conference of Heads of States of Non-aligned countries, 
held In 8flgrade from Septenfeer 1 to 6 , 19$1, In which th" then 
Prime *^lnlster of India, Jawah'^ rlal Mehru, "ds fwito* leader of 
th#> non-alloned eo«mtries» played a I^adlno role. He ImrHeltly 
20* R«X* Miller, n* II , p. 329. 
21- ibid. 
22 
rei«eted th« eonespt of Hhr«e main eurrentt* in International 
affairs* Besides* many deleQates «^o attended the eonferanee fol t 
that the Troika eoncept was against the l e t t e r tnd sp ir i t of the 
UN Charter and If put Into practice, would have rendered the whole 
UN system ineffective and Inpotent. I t says In Article 97: •The 
Secr<?tjry<«General shall be appointed by the General As<^ embly upon 
the recorwaendation of the Security Council". And It i s plain that 
the appotntm^t of Troika would have required iMfi amendment of the 
UN Charter, for Article 97 also speclf las a single Secr-tury-
23 
Q£neral.*He i s the chief administrative oft lcer ox the organisation*. 
Jawaharlal Nehru supported the necessity of executivo 
leadership rather than eoanlttse ru l s , stating that •it would not 
be desirable for the executive to be we^ensd when frequent and 
ri^ld decisions had to be made. That would mean an abdication ot 
ths respons ib i l i t i es undertaken by the United Nations, If the 
executive i t s e l f were s p l i t up and putted in different dlr-ctione 
Zw 
i t would not be able to function adequately at «Ath 8need% 
Dag Hsnmarsdtjold had s t ^ e d h i s position uoon the support 
of the so»c' l ied middle Mid small n<^ adt>ers of the UnHed Motions. 
On October 4* I960, ha saids "It i s not the Soviet Union or, Indesd, 
any other big powers which need the United Wati'^ns for th«»lr 
protection* It i s a l l th& others* In th i s sense, the organization 
22* U Thant, n. 19* p* 4 . 
23* Ib^d«, pp. 4»5. 
24* P . I . Mil ler , n. U» p* 335^ 
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i t f irst of a l l their organization, and I d««ply believe In th« 
wisdcai !«lth v#»lch they wi l l be able to use an6 guide I t , T thall 
raoaln in my post during the term of off ice as a servant of tht 
or^anUatlcn In tha Interest of a l l thosa other natl'^ns as lon^ as 
tnoy wish me to do so. 
By resigning » I would, therefore, at the present d i f f icul t 
and dangerous junetore throw the organltaticn to the winds. I have 
no right to do to because I have a respontlbi l i ty to a l l thote 
t tate mesibers for which overrides a l l other considerations ••• In 
this context, the representative of the Soviet Union spoke of 
courage. It i s very easy to resign; i t i s not easy to stay en. I t 
i s very easy to bow to t^e w i^es of the |ilg power. I t i s another 
natter to r e s i s t . As i s well known to a l l siembers of this ^ s^sdmbly 
I have done so before on many oecasiont an-J In usany directions. 
If i t i s the vviirti of thoto natlont who see in the orti^anlzatlon 
their best orotectlon In tho present world, I lAiall now lo so 
26 27 
again". However, he wished UN survival for peace and s t a b i l i t y . 
^ e n HaoDfirskjold, while CQ rotf^e to a crucial nec'tlno 
concerning Congo, died in a plane crai^ on September 17, 1961, the 
Soviet Union could have proposed that a thre«3*iiian organ be created, 
and i t CO Id have threatened to veto in the Security Council any 
attenpt to appoint a t ingle successor* But the Soviet linion wat 
23. I b i d . , p, 327. 
2ft• W.C. Sstalvad, The Uti p\ the Maintenance of World Pefce 
(New York: Asia Publishing House, 1967) » pp. 5t»59. 
27. H.T. Miller, n. 11, p . 339. 
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prepared to a^ree to the appointment of U Thant presumably with 
the knowledc^e that the 'TrolUa' Idea would have recelvf?d no more 
28 
than a dojten or so votes In tha Ganeral Asseiitoly, 
However^ an •^reement was f inal ly re^hed between the 
United States and the USSR aft«r extended orlvate discusel CW18 o n 
a forsAila under «4ileh the Saeurlty Coimcll would reeomnend the 
appointment of U Thant as Acting Secretary-General for the remainder 
of Hanmarskjold* s term. On Nov.^ iaber 3 , 1961, the Security Council 
unanimously recoeusendad the appointieimti which the General Asseiobly 
unanimously voted on tha afternoon of the same day. L' Thant 
accepted his appointment an the condition that the inteorlty of 
h i s office under the UN Charter would be fully respected. 
No«» ttic choice of Hammarskjold*s successor occupied the 
minds of al l the delegations* Three persons » Ambassador Sallm of 
Tunisia* /Embassador Frederick H. Boland of Ireland anr> Ambassador 
Halph EYickell of Finland were mentioned as iposslbl? candidates. 
The Wew Yoric Herald Tribune of September 20, 1961, camn out with 
a story that U Thant has eroerg d as thf» lea^^lng candidate, j»njoying 
the support of Asians and Africans and many other sral ler otrntriss 
^ d who, at the same time, had not be;>n involved in Hamnarskjold's 
Secretariat* The report miglit have been based on a story nublished 
in the Lond<m Observer on Saptemb«r 3 , 1961, describlno him as "a 
— — . « — — M « — M — I II mmmmmtrtmtmmmmm»m .ii.nil i — — — — I — — « — « « » . — — i iii i i — « » » « « » — — » 
28. R.A. Falk and S.H. f.?endlovit2. The Strategy of World C^der (New York: World Law Fund, Vol* 3 , 196b}, p . 344. 
29. L..v« Goodridi, u. Hao4>ro and n. Simons, n. 3 , p. 87 
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Crlppsi«v.llk« Socia l i s t and a topical ly cool c i v i l sarvant, a 
charmer, a man of Inf ini te discretion, and th? crobodinsnt of 
non-alignment* The r.peart went on to say that '\»lth Vr. fhrusch^v 
holding his view that only God i s 'nautral, i t will be interest ine 
to see what l ine he taken i f t; Thant should one day emerqe as 
the choic of norwalianed for the Secretary-G-^narsl's job. 'T Thant 
asr.erts thai the news vuas a surprise to him - an*^  he bali?v?d to 
the surprise of everybody else* He nwde i t clear to al l these 
who contacted him that he was not Interested in the post . 3ut the 
story had I t s e f fec t . Cn Sept^mber 19, 1961, before the opening 
of the General Assembly, the then Foreign Minister, Anderie Crornyko 
of the Soviet Union, had sent cne of h is senior advisers, Alexei 
Nestcrenko (v4no later became an underseer'^tary at tho United 
Nations) tc U Thjmt's of f ice to exolaln the policy of the Soviet 
Government regarding the appointment of a new Secretary-General. 
His government, he said, would s t i l l i n s i s t on 'Troika', but ?s 
an Interim measure i t would l ike to have an Interim Secr^t^ry-
General and three ^Jn-'er-Secrr-taries acting co l lec t ive ly at the 
second level* Th" Soviet Union wo"ld onposa any one nomine , 
without agreement on three Under ?''cr?t3rie« v*>o would act »« a 
teMB, ir'aspect I vr» of natl •nality or po l i t i ca l a f f l i a t ion . 7?e told 
him that If his (U Thant) name (^ a? proposed by some Cove'-nment or 
Governments, without naming the three deputies am' - ' f in ing their 
functions, the Soviet Ifrilon's opposltloh should not be lui sunder stood. 
In reply, U Thane informed him that his Governmi^ nt vnas opposed to 
the concept of 'Troika* at any level and he assured him that at any 
rat&, hi; was net at a l l Interested in the post* 
30* U Thant, n* 19» pp* 6*7* 
13 
It wat a day of axtraordinary aetlvlty. Tn the ev<»nln«|, 
sevtral dolegatlons net and considered a draft resolution to be 
tabled before th^ ^ General Asseably. The text was as follows: 
"Considering that It Is urgently inportant to 
provide due direction to the operation of the 
Secretariat p«)dlng the resolution of problems 
created by the death of Da^  HaBSDarskjold. 
/^>polnts (Mr. X) to supervise for the time 
being the direction of the Secretariat*. 
Aad>a8sad0r Stevenscn told U Thant that the United states 
wmild not favour such a resolution since the functions of the 
appointee were not specified* Ha told hi* that the United States 
strongly maintained i t s position that the Secretary-O^neral must 
function Independently Mid without restraint* as envisaged in the 
Charter* ABA>assadep Zorin said that he had no ismediate reaction 
32 
to the draft resolution* 
The Burnese Government was opposed to U Thant accepting any 
Interin appointment. It wished to see that U Thant be appointed 
on a permanent and regular basis* The Burmese Prime Minister U Nu 
was opposed to the Interio) i^ointsent for the following two 
reasons; 
31* 2kli*t P* 8* 
32. Ibid. 
14 
F l r t t , It would be l l U g a l i md t«eondlir, U Thant's position 
Mould be undernined from tho bagliming owing to non-cooperation 
ism the Soviet Government, duznese Government and U Thant, both 
33 
tnok firra stand and U Thant refuted to accept an interin appointment. 
Meanwhilet however, the Soviet Union had proposed a new interin 
f omul a wliereby a four-iaan tean would be appointed, each representing 
the East, the west, Asia and Africa. Gromyko stressed that those 
representing Asia ^ d Africa must be non-aligned, and OUB of them 
was "to preside over the team of four". The Soviet Union did not 
mention veto power, but stressed that a l l the four nhotild work 
"as a tean and with mutual understanding". But the f'»rtmila was 
34 
unaccsptDble to the Big Four* They opposed i t strongly. 
To break the deadlock, however, Burma was prepared to go 
alc«)g with a formula whereby thrss or more deputies wtere to be 
appointed to ass i s t the Secretary-General, previdedt 
"1« That there i s no question of the exercise by th m of veto 
powarsf 
2 . I t i s c learly understood that the deputies are not bloc 
representatives but representatives of thrlr respective 
countries or possibly of geographical ragions; 
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3. That such a formula is accepted by both east Snd west". 
33. Ibid.> OD. 8-9. 
34. |birt., pp, 9-10. 
35. Ibid., p. 12. 
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Mean\4ille, the Unltad States and the Soviet Union had been 
trying to work out their differences over the nuntjer of advisers 
the new Secrotary-Gcneral was to have* rn Octcber 9$ 1961, tho 
!JS*^ R agreed to five advisers (the number proposed by the United 
States) but now the two powers dls^agr^ed on the region the f i f th 
adviser was to reoresent. The United States wanted Western "u'-ope, 
while the USSR wanted Hastem Europe. The efforts continued and 
"the nurnbers game* persisted. Wo agreemsnt 'as Insloht* <"n October 13, 
1961, the Soviet position softened once aoaln. However, on October 14, 
1961, Andbassador Stevenson announced on a te levis ion intc-vlew. 
>ll Thant Is acceptable to the Soviet Union and highly acceptable 
36 
to the United States"* He went on to say, however, that the Big 
Powers s t i l l had to agree on the number of principal advisers, 
their functlcHTis and the procedures to be adopted both In the S'-curlty 
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Council and the G^eral Assembly. 
On the afternoon of October 17, 1961, Ambassador Stevenson 
told U Thant that "the numbers game" was s t i l l unresolved, and 
In view of the very serious deterioration of the Congo s i tuat ion, 
his government f e l t the extrene urgency of appointing an Interim 
Secretary-General* He said that he would talk very seriously both 
with th<> Soviet delegation and Western "u^opeans* Earlier that day 
West Germany had declared that It would reject any arrano >fnent 
If Western Europe was txcluded from the l i s t of advisers, on the 
ab. ^bld. . pp. 14.15. 
37. Ib ld . t p. 15. 
taut dayt the French Anbcstatlor told U Thant that the Western 
airopean ttatenent was bated on runoirs to the affect that the 
United States was eontemplatlnQ four principal advisers without 
Western &iropean rGpresentation* and for the f irst time, he 
confided to hin that hts govemnent would not oppose his arn^ointment. 
Fr^iiee was so opposed to the Sfpointnent of U Thant that 
a French dipioauit was reported to have told a correspondent that 
U Thant was »a short man" and did not even spe^k French". U Thant 
had reacted, as he himself puts i t , •! was taller than Nspoleon, 
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and that he did not even speak English•• 
But the Big Two continued to differ. The *ftutiA>ers gane", 
i t seened would wreck the United Natioiis. Healiiing the gravity 
of the situation, U Thant infomed the Big Two en October 19, 1961, 
that he intended to propose his o«n foraula on a nake i t or leave i t 
basis »• This seeaed to have sMiie effect. The deadlock began to 
fefreidc. The United States and the United Kingdom iS'^ ued statenents 
on FlovciRber I, I96l, that they would l ike to leave the question 
of advisers to be decided by U Thant himself. France followed suit . 
The Soviet Ambassador issued an identical statement on November ?, 
1961» U Thant was given a free hand to cone out with his formula, 
both In regard to the number of advisers and the nature of consult*, 
tlon with them. The Security Council imanimously recommended his 
name as Acting Secretary-General on Novendber 3 , 1961, and the same 
3B. Ib^d* 
n 
daVt the General Assenbly appointed hlM to serve nhe unexpired 
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tena" of Da^  Hanarskjold (ant 11 April, 19i3). Later, U Thant 
«fat appointed as Seeretary-Genaral aid served the United Nations 
frosi X96I to 1971. He relfased to be considered for a third tera 
and, eonsequently, i t becavs nseessary In 1971 to choose his 
40 
successor. 
The f irst meeting of the Security Council held on Decetcber 7, 
1971, In search of U Thant*s successor* proved abortive as the Big 
Powers vetoed each othsfrs candidal o. The Security Ciiuncil agaiA 
•at on December 17, 1971. Out of seven names proposed at the 
meeting for the post of Secretar/^General, Kurt Waldheim got ten 
affirmative votes (the necessary minimum vote i s nine) but his 
nomination %«as vetoed by China and the United Kincidom, At tho third 
meeting of the Council, held on December 20, 1971, ten n«ne« were 
proposed, only three ree^ived rec(uired votes but all three were 
vetoed. The Council once again met the next day and this time Kurt 
waldhala emerfed as a successful candidate. His name was recommended 
to the General Assasdily w^ich appointed him unanimously as Secretary-
General on December 22, 1971* 
Kurt lilal(ft)elm*s second term w«!s due to expire In December,19(ll» 
42 
but be was unprecedently seeking a third tezm. 
^' IJ2i^** PP* ^^^^* 
40* L.M. Goodrich, n. 4 , p. tB. 
41. Xshtlaq Ahmad, 'Appointing the UN Secretary-General: The Politics 
on and Behind the Scene*, Indian Journal of Pol i t ics . Vol. XV', 
Nos. 1 8. 2, 198lt p* 192* 
^2* The Tlmey of India (New Delhi) , July 10, 19S1. 
G4/^TEH I I 
SECEETAiy^GENEKAL AS AN AEMINTSTT^ ATOR 
IS 
Waldh«iB*t nain cont«n4« was T«nianla*t Foreign Mlnittar, 
Saim Ahnad Sd,\m and hit naaa was andortad by the Organisation 
of Af riean Unity. Howavar, Kurt «aldhaiB*a nana wat vetoad by 
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China and Salin** nama was vatoad by tha Unit ad States* Howaver, 
Javier Paras da Cuellar* the present ineuabent, was accepted by 
al l the Big Five. He was appointed as the fifth Secretary-General 
on January I^ 1992* 
43* Ishtiaq Ahnad« n* 4X, p. 192. 
CHAPTSI XX 
SECRETARy^ GfltgRM. AS AW AEMXWISTWVTOR 
tMd«r tli« Ch«rt«r« th» S«er«Ufy»6«n«ral i t tato chi t f 
•dntnlttrativ« of fle«r of ttio Unittd Naitont. In that capacity» 
ho i t respofitibla for taeuring tha highoot tt«)d«rd« of ef ftei?ncy» 
coopotenee afi<*^  intogrity throo^out tha Sacrst«riat« He sh-^ uld be 
r«9«rdad as th^ haad of a staff of intamationai c iv i l oarvantSt 
«iho ara not to ba infltiatiead in th« perf omanca of thair dutiat 
by nationals tdaolegical* or portonal considoratton of any kind. 
«Dnea « aieiibar of the Saerotariat i t influanead in any way by any 
authority astavnal to the erranttatton» ha ceasat to be a truly 
international c iv i l servant"* 
Tha Chartary at we have saan» mtken ttto Secretary-Ccnaral 
tha chief adninistrative officer of th@ organisation. His 
adninlstrstiva functions laaite hia the channel of connunication 
between the nanbars «id tha organs of the United Nations. He must 
supervise the preparation of wcrk for the different org^t and 
axecttta decisions as directed by than* Ha i s also responsible for 
Coerdinsting the widaspresd activities of the United Mat ions. No 
othar official i s in tha same position as the Secrotery«6enaral 
as far as sv^^all integration i s eon«ama'<« This i s particularly 
true wt^ respect to brlnoing the Specialitad Agencies Into 
19 
e« Nawton 
ao 
2 
rtlationihiii «lth the United Nations. 
Ho«f«v«r« Article 97 of the UN Charter refers to the 
Secretary-General as the ^^hlef aaelnlttrative officer of the 
Orqaniiation*, and, in this capacityf he carries out the functions 
of a c iv i l servant* Although the work i t s e l f i s carried out by 
staff of the Secretariat* i t i s the SecrdtaryoGcneral, who i s 
responsible for the #rcianIsation of taeetings of the UN bogles, 
the circulation of reports and the general preparation that m^es 
3 
for the soiooth running of the UN aachine. 
However, Article 98 re<|ulres that the "Secretary-General 
shall act in that capacity in al l sisetings of the General A8<^ embly, 
of the Security Council, of the eeononic and Social Council, and 
of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perforsi sutii other functions 
as are entrusted to hi* by these organs. The Secretary»Gf(neral 
shall Ajrite am amnual report to the General Assendbly on the work 
of the Organliation". This Article was approved at San Francisco 
without discussion or dissent* 
Avtlele 98 of the charter provides th? fraaiework for the 
Secretary»6eneral's duties in connection with serving as the 
eossBunleation link of the Organisation and In respect of preparation 
2. S.S. Goodspeed, The Nature and f"»ctlon of Internationa 
Oroanlsation (New Ybrkt Oxford university press, 1999}, p. 346. 
3. D.W* Greig, International taw (Londont Butterwo^the, 1970), 
p* 3B9* 
4. gym"^'l ^^nf<^ Natl« («fr York, IMlted Nations Office of 
lublic Information, Sixth edition, 1999), p. S57. 
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of work and 6ii«eution of daettlcvit for the various organs. Except 
In the case of th« Sscurlty Council, hs cal ls special sessions 
on the rsquast of the approprlats authority, aakes routine notlflca. 
tlons to nenbers, processes cradsntlals of delsgatss, ksaps records 
of al l maetlngt, provides and directs the staff f«r organs, 
coamlsslons, and special bodies, publishes treaties and perfar«s 
a nuDber of routine duties called for In the Charter. The Secretary-
General, m addition, has such discretionary and political 
responsibilities as dravdng up the provisional agenda for the General 
Asscnbly, the Security Council, and Trusteeship Council and 
proposing Itens for inclusion on the agenda for each of these boMes. 
He Is also reoulred to make an annual report to the General Assembly 
on ttie work of the Organlration. 
However, as the chief administrative officer of the United 
Natlonst the Secretary«General has functions and powers which are 
of an essentially managerial nature. He has responsibility for 
seeing that necessary secretarial services are provided for the 
General Assesdl^ ly, the Security Council, ECC^ OC, the Trusteeship 
Council, and th<~ large number of subsidiary organs and special 
bodies set up to do the work of the United Nations. In addition, 
he i s rasponslble for directing and supervising a wide range of 
technical servlces,such as, the preparation of background papers, 
the preparation of reports and periodical publications, and a 
oniltltude of other special technical tasks, which the Secretariat 
5. S.S. Goodspeedt n. 2, p. 347. 
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««y b« atked lo p«rfosB by the G«n«raX Ats«nbly or the Sacmity 
Council. Furth«nK>rt» lis It rotpontlbla for p«rscfin«l adnlnlstratlon. 
Including •ppolntamtti pmol lont Mid disciplinary action. He 
met ovarcea tiia adnlnlttratlon of the finances of the Oroanication. 
HMiavar« financial functions Involve the preparation of the 
united Nations budgatt the allocation of all funds* the collection 
of all contributions froi tha »anbars* and control over expenditures. 
The Secret3ry-Cenaral al«o eialnt^ins custody of all the funds* 
Consequently» the fiscal officers of the" Secret.srlat draw up the 
budget and the Sacretary-iGeneral presents It to the M«a«bly as 
a part of his annual financial roport. 
Tha Sacretary<»Genaral presents the annual r -port of the 
United Nat ions» covering the views of the Secretary->General on 
aehleven««ts of the past year, the state of Intarnatlonal affairs 
and how th^ organlsatlcn and Its mmbmn can do batter to proaote 
i t s purposas. 
The Gene<*^ l Asssnbly f^las of procedure provide that the» 
Seeretary»Gonar^l ^ a l l not only make an annual report but also 
•such suppleftentary reports as are required** (^ule 91). He Is 
required to coMeunlcate the annual report to the aiei^ers at least 
f«rty«>flv^ days before th^ opening of tha regular session. The 
Intro^ctlen aiay be, an^ ! usually Is subnitted later. The provlaiorv«l 
6. L.M. Goodrich, THe Uni y^d Ni^ ^^ onf f^t a gifn^fffg World 
(Haw York: CelusA»la University Press, 1974), p. Sg. 
7. S.S. Goodspaad, n. 2 , p. 347. 
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•Qtnda of th« General Assanbly mitt inelude the r-port of th« 
Seeretary-Genoral. The report has not benn mada the subjeet of 
ditcusslon In the Q^naral debates at the beginnlnti of each sasslon 
of the General Ass«Bbly» as was the praetiea of the La^ QUie of 
lt>Iatlons, and no resolutions have been adopted concemlnQ i t . 
Furtheraiore, the Secretary-General i s responsible for the 
organization and adninittratlon of the Secretariat. However, his 
choice of staff - siore particularly of higher staff . and his 
leaderihlp will largely determine the character and efficiency of 
the Secretariat as a whole* It i s on hla that will aainly fall the 
duty of creating and nalntainlng a teas spirit in a body of officials 
recruited fron nany countries. As the official spokesman for the 
United Nations, the Secretary-General represents the organisation 
in all i t s negotiations with the governnents of neiDbers and 
nonsKMnbers alike and with outside agencies. His press confer^^nces, 
public addresf^es and press releases speak authoritatively for the 
9 
United Nations. 
The Secretary-General i s the chief administrator or manaoer 
of the united Nations. His strategic position at the Intersectir'n 
of the political and administrative sectors of the Organization 
provides hla with opportunities for offering init iative and leader-
ship in both sectors* He maintains cQntM:ts with governnents and 
their representatives in the United Nations delegations. He personally 
8. L.M* Goodrich, E. HaB4>ro, A.p, Simons, Qtarter of the United 
Ffationti Contentary and Docuaients (Mew York: Columbia university 
Press, X969), p. »»•• 
9 . S.S, Goodspved, n. 2, pp* 347.40. 
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p^rforas those administrative tasks In «*ilch he Is «o»t Interested 
and vdhleh nwit enhance his position of leadership, and delegates 
to others the ramaindsr* He appoints Secretariat personnel, within 
the constraints previously outlined, and i s the primary source of 
plans for restructuring the adslnlstrative franewock, a process 
fundamental to iaiproveiRent of adninlstrative effectiveness and 
ef t lc lency. In carrying out his administrative functions, the 
Secretary-General must represent the epitone of discretion and 
neutrality aiBo«ig naatber s ta t e s . A^  the sane tijie he imist ur:>hold the 
principles and purposes of the ^rganlfation. 
Xn attempting to unify the staff as an ef f ic ient administrative 
imit , the Secret3ry.General confronts a parad<»tleal set of factors, 
centrifugal forces ( in addition to the representational basis for 
apfointment of heads of major departments and of f i ces , and short-term 
contacts for a minority of employees) include the compartm^ntaliza-
tlon of the Secretariat into I t s specif ic functions and a c t i v i t i e s . 
Opposed to these centrifugal forces are th unifying factors 
available to the Secretary-General* Insofar as the staff council 
has been ut i l i zed to develops policy ccmceming staff welfare, an 
esDfit j[2 fogps has bsen established for the entire Secretariat* 
The staff neeibsrs ars inclined to sa l ly behind the maximalist 
philosophy of the S@cretary.Ganeral because an expansion of executive 
pew«r i s sharsd by a l l members of the Secretariat . Th<? career of 
International Civil Servants also develops in common with the 
Secrotary-Gensrsl, s devotion to the broad principles and ourposes 
of the Organization, which binds th?m together in a sense of mission. 
2» 
Final ly , the $eerdtary*Gen«ral autt inspira his staff by his 
leadarship and by teeklrtg thair support In their eomffion e f forts . 
Artic le 63 of the Charter a s s i e s to the Beonomle and Social 
Council the task of coordinating the a c t i v i t i e s of the Specialised 
Agencies and the United Nations in sconoalc and social projects , 
but, of necess i ty , the Secretary-General Is the chief coordinator. 
In I t s f i r s t year of operation, the Economic and Social Council 
authorised the Secretary-General to establish an Ad^lnlstr-::tlve 
Committee on Coordination composed of the administrative heads of 
the Specialised Agencies and to serve as I t s Chairman, " t^her efforts 
at coordination by the Secretary-General are carri?M^ out thr^ '^tcih 
the preparation of r-'ports for the i^ concmlc and Soci i l round 1 anH 
through nultlagency coi^oratlvi activltl-^s in such areas as tpchnlc^l 
10 
asslst<tfice and economic devalc^ment* 
The Sseretary-Ganaral I s more than the chief adtninistrative 
officer of the United Nations. Under Article 99 of the rhart^r, he 
i s also a high po l i t i ca l officer* In that Cc^acity, he miy t ^ e the 
lead In dealing «dth matters that may threaten th'' maintenance of 
international peace and security. In this respect, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations has far greater p o l i t i c a l powers 
11 
than his counterpart in the League of Nations had. According to 
to 
Art l e i • 99, *The Secretary-General nay bring/the attention of the 
10. A.L. Benatt, Intematlonial Oroanisatlont Prjn^li^les and Issues 
(New Jerseyt Prentice-Hall, I n c . , 1977), pp. 33&.39. 
11* U Thant, n* 1, p . 29* 
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Security Council any nattar which in h i t opinion nay threaten 
the maintenance of international peace and s e c u r i t y . 
This Article confers upon the Secretary-»G^«ral of the 
United Nations world po l i t i ca l respons ib i l i t i e s wh^ch no individual, 
no representative of a single nation, aver had beforf*. Fu'-thermore, 
froB i t derived further rights that were soon to be written into 
the Rules of Procedura of the Security Council» the G'-neri!. Asseiubly, 
the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council. The 
Secretary-Gdneral was to be empowered to propose I tarns for the 
aganda of those organs and to take part in the debat6 8, rights th a 
othorwisa ware reserved to government, and to representatives of 
nenber states* 
Consequently, the UN Chartor extenried tho a ^ i n l s t n t l v s 
functions of the Secratary«-Gtjneral to the po l i t i ca l field,nA doubt 
enabling hiai ( in the sp ir i t of the "Mbert Thomas* precadent) to 
act ovsr and above his functions as chief administrative off icer . 
Moreover, we * ^ a l l pBvform sudi other functions as are entrustt^d 
14 
to him" by the repr««entativr' organs. In this way the Secretary-
General may receive, in addition to h i s administrative poti^rs, also 
p o l i t i c a l power. Vfhile these powers under Article 96 are delegated, 
he can act independently of any other organ under Article 99, 
12* T. Brownlie, Basic Documents of Intsrnati nal Law (Cxfordj 
Clarendon press. X907)t p* 2g» s^e aiso nverymJw'i's united 
Nations, n .4 , p. S57. 
13. Trygve Lle» In the Cause of peace (New York: The Macmillan 
Coopany, 1954j, pp. 39-40. 
14. R.A. Falk and S.H. Mendlovitx» The United Nations (New York: 
World Law Fund, 1966), p. 307. 
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with authorises hl» to "bring tbe ths attention of the Security 
Council any matter which In his opinion may threaten the aalntenanee 
of International peace and security"* Thus, he may enter the scene 
as a spokesman of international interast and takt action In the 
15 
sp ir i t of vitat has bean tentatively cal led the *Thomas Doctrine'. 
Thus, according to Article 99, the Secret^ry^G net I Is oiven 
a double dlfcretlon. Before going to the Security Coun*;!!, he has 
to decide whether In his opinion the matter could b. e l 'o lb le tc 
be put on the agenda of the Security Council. Article 99 mako? i t 
c lear that he may do so , but that there Is no duty or him to go 
so far. At the San Francisco conference, th? probliw of th- rlqht 
or duty of the Secr^^tary-Gsneral to act under Article 99 was 
vent i lated, but the idea of imposing a duty on him wa? definitely 
abandoned. 
The Preparatory Commission, referring to the f^pcr-^tary 
Gene'-al's right undor Article 99 as "a quite sped 1 rloht whirh 
goes beyond any pov^ er previously accorded to the head of on Inter-
national organ:aatlon« concluded that i t was Hmpos^ ^ l^blc to forosee 
how th i s art ic le will be applied, but the resoonslbl l i ty It confers 
upon the Sacretary-Genaral wi l l require tha exercis . of th hlohest 
17 
qual i t i e s of po l i t i ca l Judgement, tact and integr i ty . 
JL6« M ^ « f P« 310. 
17. L.*'. Goodrich, fi. Hantoro and A.^, Slmon«;, n. ft, n. S98. 
I t Is the Secretary-General's broader po l i t i c s i powers v^ich 
provide the centrist between the role of the United Nations Secretary-
General and th i t of th^ League of Nations Secretary-General. That 
the Secr<iitary-G<>ner£l should have an inportant p o l i t i c a l role vias 
clearly desired by those Mho wrote the UN Charter, but what was 
not and could not be anticipated was tho exact form that role wo'-ld 
as<=uaie. A nunbsr of tractors have contributed to i t s dp>flnUlor 
in practice: 
1. The Secretary-General's position as tho pt^rmanent, top-ranklnq, 
full«*time o f f i c ia l able to speak for the orci^nlzatlon as a 
whole; 
2» the advantages he enjoys in his relations vdth the rcllU.c^l 
organs as tho result of the expertise and detailed kno*vl Hae 
that he commands; 
3. the l iadtations imposed on the Security Council by the 
di f f icul ty i t s permanent members have in r^achinc H taller* 
agreements; 
4 . the inherent inabi l i ty of the Assembly to perform executive 
function; 
5 . the dagree of confidence that oecupants of the of f ie 3 have 
insnlred In th* manner In whid) they have dlscharped 
responsibi l i t ies olaced upon them; and 
6 . the willInonesR of m«^ mber c^ove^nments to entrust l-^inortant 
functions to the United Nations and I t s organ. 
29 
The Secretary-General i s able to exercise important p o l i t i c a l 
fimctions In a nimbftr of ways; 
1. as the o f f i c ia l representa t ive of the United Nations; 
2. as the o f f i c ia l vested with specif ic r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s under 
reso lu t ions of the General Assembly and the Councils; 
3 . 3S the- p-^ssessor of a special r igh t und^r Ar t ic le 9^* and 
4 . as the head of one of the pr inc ipal oroans resoonsible for 
purposes and p r inc ip le s of the Char ter . 
In h i s p o l i t i c a l funct ions, the Secretary-Central may exercise 
considerable influ<»nce on gensral policy as well as the posi t ion 
of i rd iv idua l members. In h i s r e la t ionsh ip with the organs of tha 
United Nations, there are several instances in which he may d i r ec t ly 
or i nd i r ec t l y bring influence t o bear on dec is ions . Lxamples of 
t h i s are h i s drawing up of provisional agenda for each of the 
p o l i t i c a l organs and the placing of items on the agenda of the 
General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. In addi t ion , he may 
make ora l or wri t ten statements to the Security Council, th^ "^ General 
Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, and E(X'Src on any matter \\blch 
has re la ted t o a question before i t . He cannot make a statems^nt t o 
ECOSOC or the Trusteeship Council unless so invited by the appronriate 
presiding officer but such an inv i t a t i on i s not nec»^ssary with respect 
18. L.M. Goodrich, The United Nations in a Changing World, n . 6 , 
pp. 89-90. 
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to the Ass«Rbly and the Security Council. 
The Secretary-Genaral reprasents the Organization in i t s 
relation ¥dth nenber governments and i t s external relat ions oenerally. 
In his relations ««ith member oiovernments he serves as a useful 
source of infornation, an advisor, and a stimulator of po l ic ies 
and action in support of United Nations purposes and principles . 
He makes cortacts with governments both by v i s i t s to member capitals 
and by receiving member o f f i c i a l s at headquarters, but even more 
important, in contrast to the League practice, are tho opportunities 
provided at the headquarters for easy and continuing contacts with 
the permanent representatives of member ^vemments. In addition, 
formal agreements with governments and other organizations are 
concluded by the Secretary>General, although as a rule they recfuire 
20 
the approval of the General Asseodbly. 
By reading his constitutional trust into Articles 97, 98 and 99, 
the Secretary-General can, subject to the limitation of power 
p o l i t i c s , help to cement their presumed cooperation, Fven i f 
measures taken by him are not prima facie related to internsttonal 
lawt they are bound to have an impact on the development of new 
21 
standards of international behaviour. 
The Charter reserved fcxr the Secretary-Gene al power of 
appointment to a l l posts in the Secretariat and in Article 100, 
19. S.S. Goodspeed, n. 2, p. 348. 
20. L.M. Goodrich, n.6 , pp. 90-91. 
21 . R.A. Falk and S.H. Mendlovitz, n. 14, p. 323. 
31 
spelltd out In th(> following unequivocal terns the excluslv'^ly 
International resixmtlblUtl^s of this c iv i l service f©r the 
wo l^d organlzatlont 
"1. In thf? perfornanee of their duties the Secrotary-Ganeisl 
and the sfcaff shall not seek or receive Instructions frooi any 
Qovernnent or fro« any other authority external to the Or^  nlzatlon. 
They shall refrain from any action v*»lch ndoht reflect on their 
petition as International officials responsible only to the 
Organisation. 
2» Each Menbsr of the United Nations undtftakes to respect the 
sxcluslvely International character of the responsibilities of the 
Secretary^Gensral and the staff and not to S'»ek to Influene** t h ^ 
2? 
In the discharge of their responsiblUtlss." 
The Article 100 reflects the standards the f irst *>ecr<?tary-
General of the League sought to apply and «^ich were accepted by 
the naj(»rlty of the nemberSt thou^ the Covenant contained no 
express proviA ons to this effect* 
The Preparatory Comnlssitwi observed that "(If) It i s to enjoy 
ths c<»ifldence of all morabers of the United Nations, the Secretariat 
23 
isust be truly International In eharactsr. After quoting the 
provisions of Article 100, the Ccsonissian continued: "Such a 
Sseretarlat c^fiot be composed* even in part* of national represent 
tatives responsible to Governments, the Secretary.General and the 
22» EvervBsan's iMited Nations (1959)t n, 4, pp.557«Sllj See also 
Trygve t i e , n, 13, p. 40# 
23. L•^ U Goodrich, H. Harrbro and A.P. Simons, n* 8, p. 594. 
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staff «dll not b» th^ sarvants of the stato of v\^ich they ars 
nationals^ but the servant only of the United Matlons. . .". 
However, the fact that the Secretary.Gencral Is an of f ic ia l 
w l ^ po l i t i ca l power as well as administrative functions had direct 
ImpllCdtlons for the nethod of se lect ion . Consequently, the drafters 
of the Charter laid emphasis on the personal responsibi l i ty of 
the Sec rettery-General, Tt 1$ ho v*io Is solely responsible for the 
performing the functions entrusted to hlra for the appolntmnnt of 
a l l members of the Secretariat vn^^ for as*furlng the oroan that the 
Secretariat wi l l carry out thoir tasks under his exclusive authority. 
The Idea of "Cabinet system" in w*ilch responsibil i ty for adrrlnlstra-
tion and p o l l t i c s l functions would bo distributed amonq several 
25 
individuals was squarely rejected. 
Furtharnora, the Chartar in Article 101, also establishes the 
principle that "The paramount consideration in the employment of 
the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service 
^ a l l be th? necessity of securing the highest standards of 
eff ic iency, compelf>nce, and integr i ty . Due regard shall bv paid 
to the importanco of recruiting the staff en as vA^f a g^onrcphlral 
2m 
basis as possible". 
24. Ibid. 
23 . P^ . Watars, Tnternatl-nal Oroanlaation (Mew York: Th? M:icmlllan 
Companyj London: Collier wacmllian Lid. , 1967), pv, 18U82, 
26. Everyman's United Nations (19S9), n. 4, p. SM; Se also 
S.S. Goodspeed, n. 2, p. 361. 
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T* sun up, the Chartar laid do«ti thasa assantial la^al principles 
for m Intemational Civil Sarvleas* I t was to ba an international 
body, racroitad primarily for aff leleney, eompatence and Intaorlty, 
but on as wide geographteal basis as poss ible , i t was to bo headed 
by a Secretary-Genaral who earrlad const i tut ional ly the reaponslbillty 
to other principal organs for the Secretariat work. And f ina l ly . 
Article 98 ent i t led the General Assembly and the Security Council 
to entrust the Secretary-General with tasks goino beyond the verba 
forioalia of Article 97 « with i t s e&f>hasi$ on the administrative 
function « thus, opt ing the door to a neasure of po l i t i ca l respohsi* 
b i l i t y «*tich i s dist inct from the authority expl ic i t ly acrorded 
to the Secretary-General under Article 99 but in keeping with th" 
sp ir i t of that Articlu. 
This l a s t laentionad davelopnant concernlnq thn S«!(crf?t'3ry-C'^eral, 
with I t s < t^>vious consequences for the Secretariat a?, such, t^ikes 
us beyond the concept of a non-polit ical c i v i l service Into an ar-^ a 
%4iere the o f f i c i a l , in the exercise of h is functions, may be forced 
to take stands of a p o l i t i c a l l y controversial nature. It does 
t h i s , however, on an intemational basis and, thus, vrttho-t ''epartlnq 
from the basic concept of "neutrality*. In fact . Article 98 as well 
as Article 99 would be unthinkable without ths compl^m-nt of Article 
27 
100 Str ict ly observed both in l e t t er and spirit* 
Howavor, under the revised Regulatimt, the Secretary-General 
nay teininate a permanent appointoent •If sudi action would be In 
27. M. Waters, n. 29, p. 182* 
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th« Intarett of tht good •dnlnistration of the Organisation and 
m aeeordanea with the standards of the UN Charter, proyldad that 
the action i s not contested by the staff maobsr eoneemad". The 
Secretary-Gensral nay inpose disciplinary maasures on staff menders 
whose conduct i s unsatisfactory. He nay *^umarlly dismiss" a 
nenbar for serious nisconduct (Regulation 10). Disciplinary measures 
consist of written censure, suspension without pay, demotion, anrf 
suMtary dismissal. The Aiteinistrative Tribunal has defined conduct 
punishable undtr staff regulation 10 to be "either nisconduct 
coMRltted in the exercise of a staff member's professional duti«s 
or acts committed outside his professional activit ies but prohibited 
29 
by provisions creating general obligations for staff members ••. 
Some people may say that the Secret^ry^General, who more than 
anyone else symbolises the Organisation as a whole, must be an 
outspoken public servmt endeavouring to expres« the views of all 
peoples. He should not merely service ttiited Nations* meetings} 
he should seek to influence the course of debates. The Secretary. 
General of the League of Natlans« this school of thought holds, 
wtre far too retiring. The Covenant of the League gave them l i t t l e 
basis for policical activity, and they did not develop adeguaiely 
siiat basis th«re was. in contrast, the Secretary^Geneval of the 
United Nations should emerge as a bold leader of international 
thought and action, as a genuinely international figure stimulating 
28. L.M, Goodrich, E. HaB4>ro and A.P. Sltsons, n. 8, p. 608. 
29. Ibid. 
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th« Me«b«r tUtes to rise above th«lr natlonallitlc disposition. 
Ths nation dolsqatlons (th« arguments run) tend to look at problens 
froi their national points of viaw . they ara traditionally bound 
to saa tha International intarast In t a n s of their national 
Interests, but a solution to a problem irtilch Is truly In the Inter. 
national Interest Is mora than the sum of the national positions 
n^lch the dalefatlons adwrnee, and the Secretary-General i s 
uniquely placed to perceive this higher International solution an6 
30 
propound It If he so wishes. 
The role iMhtch the franers of the Charter of the United Ngtir^ns 
envisaged for the Secretary-Cenesal fe l l between th? two extremes. 
The Secret3ry»Gcnar3l unquestionably would ba under an oblloation 
to pay a great political par; but Trygve Lie said, "that he fe l t , 
there were limits to the extent of his init iative . the limits 
imoosad by the realit ies of national and internatlor^a 1 political 
l i fe" . The Secret3ry«XSen«ral ml^t be the symbol of the Organization 
99 a whole - the s^inbol, in other words, of the in t^ ^ mat tonal spiri t . 
This, and his strategic situation at the very centre of international 
affairs as confident of the world's statesmen and as spokesmen to 
the world's peoples, attached significant Influence to his position; 
but It was a moral powar, not a physical one, and the moral power* 
in this world* Is not conclusive* The Secretary-Ceneral, i t was 
said, should be more the general thmn the Secretary - but where 
were his division? In the words of Trygve Lie, "Thus, I inclined, 
30. Trygve Lie, n. 13, p. 41* 
31. Ibid*, p. 42. 
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iron the beginning, toward a middla way « a pragnatie and op«n 
nindad approach. I would l is ten to all ny advisers and ba directed 
by none. X had no calculated plan for developing the political 
powers of the office of Secretary«Gencral» but I v«as determined 
that the Secretary-General should be a force for peace. How that 
force would be applied X would find out * In the l ight of 
32 
developraents* 
While Trygve t i e conceived the offlc*? of thp Secretary-Gener 1 
In a statesoianllke way, Hamarskjold Rnist be eonsldeved the 
originator and formulater of a jsj^ generis UN nultilater'il diplomacy. 
It i s his oierit to have comblmd public «dth private (traditional) 
diplomacy within the framework of the United Nations en an unpreee» 
33 
dented scale. But It would be difficult to define the diplomatic 
act ivit ies of the Sacratary-Gcmeral with absolute precision. The 
pr^Mjrtional measure of his dependence or ini ependence of action 
could perhaps best be assessed by a Joint reading of Articles 97, 98, 
99 and 33 of ths Charter. Article 97 provides him with adminIstr.^tive 
machinery n^lch enables him to caorry out executive functions In 
the internal or extemal spheres. On the other hand, Article* 98 
makes him ^ e bearer of powers viilch he could not assume without 
delegation. Finally, the joint application of Articles 3? and 99 
enables him to tdte diplomatic ini t iat ives . 
32- Xbld. 
33. R.A. Falk and S.H. Mendlovltz, n. 14, p. 312. 
34. 1 ^ « » p. 315. 
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No doubt* there i t tone fofct lit th« argitiofit that io^al 
position of the Saeret«r)M3«n«ral i t *ifatat^o witonilio* analogous 
to that of th« bearor of pratidenttat pow@r«. Thara tte^t h 
atsantiai diffaraneat bat%»a^  tha two idilch are eonnaet^d with 
tha aleetion (^ipoints^t) of tha SaeratartMSanaral by» anH hit 
dapandefiea ofif tht raprattntativa or^aiit of tha Unit ad Natlont. Tha 
Sacratary«6anaril has no diract »pp*9l to tha alactorata (i*a* to 
Bcnbar ttatat) and hit international retpontibility to tha oroMniaa. 
tion as ttipolatad in Artie!a 100 doat not allow Hia to riaa, 
with the help of indepandant cesiB titutiohal pow r^Sf abov- tha 
rspres^ntativa organs. Howevor, thar? i t no doetrina of ^^arliaroontary* 
suprcnacy Inscrlbod In tha itl Chartar «^leh would reaarva to 
anyone of the principal organs a paranoui^ potitian. Tha ^acretory* 
Ganaral i t one of tha principal orgmit and, in tha light of the 
adnlnittrative at well at the politic 1 theory* thara i s rooe for 
asruning that ha bears an independent eo<»ratpontibility (with othar 
orgtfit) f<r the e^ anagciRaRt of IM affairs* w^ or«HSver» at a patwanant 
and axclusively internationally responsible c ivi l tarvMit, tha 
SecretnrywGenaril aiay be presoasd to be tha "Tom titutio^al noardi.m* 
of the principles of the IW Chartc*r» Tha rise of th« Secrptary. 
Central to the level of an international apekasmen ti<riias him, at 
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the sane tins* the fwardlan of the *P< t^a ScJwt Sarvandf" principle 
in ralatlcn to the UN Ctiarttr* 
9&* HSiid** PP* 32i»:«l. 
CHAPTER I I I 
SECRETAF(y,G8^ERAL AS A PEACE4/</«KEP 
CHAPTER XXX 
Tide* in th« twtntlttli centurft th« seourQ* of war brouqht 
untold sorrow to n«nklnd «nd «ftor both the wars maiAlnd r>lecl9«d 
to ottabl i th eocidltlorts which would anture a bottor world ordor • 
• world in which violenca could be roduced t i c m t f i c ^ t l y t peace 
and security could be ensured; and conditions for econonie welfare, 
social Justice and respect for hum n^ rights and ftmdamental freedrms 
could be created. Thus» the league of Nations casw into existence 
after the First Morld War» but, unfortunately, i t fa i l sd BWi then 
2 
cane the United Nations • a revised version of the Leaoue. ^Mdoibte'lly 
Improved in aany respect and representing a fresh approach to 
the world probJleas with the purpose to "naintain intemdtlonal peace 
and security} to develc^ friendly relations amonq nations; and to 
cooperate internationally in solving international problans of 
an economic, soc ia l , cultural txe hwanltarian character, and in 
proBioting and encouraging respect for h«Hi«n rights and fundanent^l 
3 
freedom for all* 
However, the primary responsibi l i ty for maintainlnq inter-
national peace and sec ir i ty i s given to the *^dcurity council , but 
1. U Brownlie ( e d . ) , gasic P9|V»f>t« of Intomati-^al law (Oxfords Clarendon press , 1957), p* ?. 
2* In l s L. Claude, J r . , Swords into ^^gw^^ff*' The ProbUms ^ d 
?i?9f*** of Intemati-'nal Oroantiatfion (Ngw Yorki ^anr^rm Houj loute, 
3 . I . Brownlie, n. 1 , p . 3 . 
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th«re are a nimbar of caaat irfiara statas have directed th^ir 
notlf l«atlon of a dispute or other situation not direct to the 
Council, but to the Secretary-General; thus, glvinq him a choice 
oi action i t would then be ttx the Secretary-General to bring the 
natter to the attention of the Council i f he thought f i t (acting 
under Article 99 of the UN Charter). 
According to Article 99, "The Secretary-General may bring 
to the attention of the Security Council any matter which In his 
opinion nay tt^reaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security. The Secretary-General i s , therefore, equal in this rescact 
to any govermtent of the United Nations or to the General ^ssembly 
99 a Mhole* Consecuently, the Secretary-G^ierdl becomes th« 
custodian of international peace and security. V^enever, or «#ierever, 
p o l i t i c a l , econonde or tsr'- ltorial d i f f i cu l t i e s aopear which may 
threaten world peace, i t I s his right and duty to put th^ s im machinery 
in notion. There i s as yet no precise interpretation of th*:^ ?* powers 
of the Secretary-G^^ner^l. In the concept of the rharte , hp i s 
nennt to be not only an element of vigi lance but also one of 
Inspiration to the UnHed Nations as a wAiole. That i s why he also 
has the right to put on the agenda of the Assanbly any iten ho may 
consider to be inpffirtant and to f a l l within the scope of the 
United Nations. 
4 . D.W. Greig, International Law (London} Sutterworth, 1977), p.559. 
5. I . Brovmlie, n. 1, p. 29. 
6 . Louis David, The Uilte<y Nation^ (Londonj Phonix House, 1946), 
p. 82. 
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The Seeretary-General, under I r t l e l e 99 of the Charter, Is 
empowered to bring to the attention of the Security Council any 
matter \(«hich in his opinion may threaten world peace. He i s , in a 
sense* to act as the eyes and ears of the organization and i t s 
members* If a threatening situation arises and no member state 
brings the matter to the attention of the Security Council* the 
Security Council, on the insistence of the Secretary-General, may 
consider the matter* He, thus, needs to be fully informed about 
d i f f i c u l t i e s before they actually ar ise , so that he wil l be in a 
position to decide whether to exercise h i s formal rights under 
Article 99 would be worthwhile. Hammarskjold expl ic i t ly invoked 
th i s concept of Article 99 to just i fy his v i s i t to Tunisia in 196lv 
•It i s obvious that the duties following frcm this Article cannot 
be f u l f i l l e d unless the Secretary-General, in case of need, i s in 
a position to form a personal qpinion about the relevant facts of 
the situation which may represent such a threat (to international 
peace and security) 9. 
It was presumably this Art ic le , which provided the legal 
basis for the authority granted to the Secretary-General in conn^x-
tion with the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East. The crucial 
role now played by the Secretariat, and,in particular, by the 
Secretary-General, arises from weaknesses in the functioning of 
the United Nations. The foimders intended that the Security Council 
should have primary responsibil ity for maintaining world peace. 
The Council was to have at i t s disposal an international military 
force to give effect to i t s decisions. The great powers were to 
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have permanent membeTship of the Council, with right to veto most 
substantive decisicms. 
7 
Howev«r, the preparatory Commission of the United Nations 
in i t s report submitted in 1945 elaborated on Article 99 as follows: 
"The Secretary-General may have an important role to play as a 
mediator and as an informal advisor of many Governments, and IRWIIL 
undoubtedly he called upon from time to time. In the exercise of 
his administrative duties to take decisions v^ich may just ly be 
called p o l i t i c a l . Under Article 99 of the Qiarter, moreover, he 
has been given quite special rights which go beyond any power 
previously accorded to the head of an international organization, 
v i z* , to bflng to the attenticm of the Security Council any matter 
(not merely any dispute or situation) which in his qpinion may 
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. I t 
i s impossible to foresee how this Article wil l be applied; but 
the responsibi l i ty i t confers upon the Secretary-General will 
require the exercise of the highest qual i t ies of po l i t i ca l judgement, 
tact and integrity** 
This, in fac t , i s the only of f ic ia l guidance available to 
the Secretary-General on the implications of Article 99, which, 
according to records, was adopted with very l i t t l e debates in 
San Francisco* The right to bring matters to the attention of the 
Security Council implies that the Secretary-General can use his 
7. Evan Luard, The Evolution of International Organization 
(New York, Washington: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967), 
pp. 94-95. 
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own discretion* without the guidance or authorization of the 
Security Council or the General Assembly, to conduct Inouiries 
or to engage in diplomatic act iv i ty in regard to matters relating 
to the maintenance <^ f international peace and security* In this 
connection. Article 33 of the Charter i s also relevant* I t says: 
"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which i s l ikely 
to endanger the maintenance of international p e ^ e and security* 
sha l l , f i r s t of a l l , seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conci l iat ion, arbitration. Judicial settlement, resort 
to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of 
their own choice". 
When these two Articles are taken together, the Secretary-
General enjoys special powers of po l i t i ca l or diplomatic i n i t i a t i v e 
10 
that no Secretary-General of the League of Nations enjoyed. In 
matters relating to international peace and security, however, two 
simple considerations are Inescapable* F ir s t , the Secretary-Gcnergl 
must always b« prepared to take an I n i t i a t i v e , no matter what the 
consequences to his office or to him personal ly may be. If he 
sincerely believes that i t might mean the difference between peace 
and war* In such a s i tuat ion, the personal prestige of a Secretiry-
General - and even the position of h i s office - roust be considered 
to be expendable. The second cardinal consider at! cm must be the 
8. U Thant, View from the UN (London: David and Charles Newton 
Abbot, 19^7j, p. 30* 
9* I* Brownlie, n. 1, p. 12. 
10* U Thant, n. 8, p. 30. 
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maini«nanc8 of the S«cretary<-Geii«ral's Independent pos i t ion , a« 
set out in ATtiele 100 of the Oiwtsr , «hich alone can give hin 
the fr««dGtt to act , idthout fear or favour, in the interest of 
world paaee. Such independence does not iaply any disrespect for 
the wishes or (pinions of neraber iovemments* On the contrary,his 
independenee I s an insurance with his oath of offic^, the loncKtom 
11 
interest in peace of all menibers of the nre|anlZ'?t1on. 
Moreover, Article 99, in i t s precise and full weanino, was 
never expl ic i t ly invoked by a Secretary-General unti l th-^  ronqo 
c r i s i s of 1960Uhough Tryqve Lie invoked in the Korean c r i s i s of 
1950 and Hannarskjold araiounced that he would have us»d i t in th? 
Sues c r i s i s of 19S6,had the USA not taken the necessary In t t i a t ivo ) . 
What, however, has repeatedly happened «. so characteristic of the 
UN*s treatment of i t s Charter • i s that I t has been interpreter^ as 
providing tha Secretary-Genaral tdth a reservoir of po l i t i ca l 
authority on which he can draw or not as his Judooment, eourace 
and patience may suggest. Over the years a body of precedents, i^ oms 
good, sane not so good, have been accumulated to oulde the Sceretazy. 
12 
General in the use of h i s power. 
However, Article 99 was relied on by Trygve Lie In an informal 
way in th? Iranian or Greek <|uestlons in 1946, the BerMn Blockade 
in 1944.48, the roBwnunist Coup in Ca^•cho8lovakia, ^r' later In the 
12. H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a po l i t i ca l Inst i tut ion 
(Mew Yoric, Loiidont Oxford University Press, 1971), p . 171. 
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«natt«r of the Statute of Treaties In 1948, and also ^n the question 
of the partit ion of Palestine In 1948 and of the representation 
of China in the UnHed Nations In 1930, in ¥(hlch the Secr3tary-
Gs^eral advocated the admlision of the Peking Government to the 
united Nations. In a nuBd>er of cases , the Secretary General's 
intervention took the for© of submission of legal iBeiJ!oranf»a anJ 
towards the end of h i t terw of o f f ice , Trygve Lie l6d before the 
13 
General As'^ e^ndtly. 
However, in 1950, Trygve Lie presented "a fn^ HBorendure of Points 
for Consideration in the Devalopment of a Twenty Year Pngranroe 
fc»r Achieving ?e»CB through the United Nations**. The meaordndum 
consisted of a *Pr@as)ble* and 'Ten Points*, are as follows*.-
1. Inauguraticxi of periodic meetings of Security Council attended 
by foreign n in l t ters or other nefflbers of gcveminents; 
2. new effort to control atomic energy; 
3* Hew approadi to armantents control , both nuclear and conventional! 
4* Serious efforts to readi agreemc^nt on araed forces to be 
Blade available und^r Chartari 
5 . |iroce«d toward universal membershipi 
6< a sound and serious programne of technical assistance and 
broad scale capital Investncnt; 
13, a.A. Falk and C.H. .V^endlovltz. The United Naticns. V ' l , 3 
(New Yorkj Vtorld Law Fund, 1966), p . 312. 
14. Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New Yorkj The Macmillan 
Company, 1956), p. 277. 
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7. more active role by specialized agencies; 
8 . vfidar observance and respect for human rights; 
9> use of the United Nations to promote peaceful change; and 
10* use of United Nations machinery to speed up the dev3lopment 
of International Law. 
Lie suggested that *>vinat we need, what the world naods", he 
said that he used the phrase because he wished "to le t everybody 
know that the question of peace in the world i s a question which 
16 
cannot be set t led immediately but which wil l taka time". 
About the twenty.year progranme for peace, Trygve Lis said that 
as a Secretary-General, i t i s my firm bel ief that a new and great 
effort must be attempted to end the so-called "cold war" and to set 
the world ones more on a road that wil l offer greater hope of 
17 
last ing peace. 
In the memorandum, he s ught to differentiate between represen-
tation in the United Nations and the question of diplomatic recooni-
tion by the member s ta t e s . He argued with force that representation 
did not involve recognition, that China was a permanent member of 
the Security Council irrespective of the nature of his government. 
15. Ib id . , pp. 278-82. 
16. R.I . Mil ler, Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis nip lorn acy (New York: 
Oceana Publications, I n c . , 1961), pp. 4-5. 
17. Trygve Lie, n. 14, p. 278. 
In h i t vl«w, i t should b« th« tctk of th« Security Council to 
d*tamine n h i ^ of the two Chinese govemnents - Comnunitt or 
Nationalist • actually rr^presented the Chinese peopl-* and, hence, 
would be ent i t led to membership* Howevert any succes*^ wihlch Lie 
gained by these arguments in foreign capitals was ended by the 
X6 
North Korean aggression in June, 1950. 
Trygve Lie stated before the General Assembly on ?5nt:rr.ber 23, 
19B0» that he employed Article 99'for the f i r s t time* before the 
Security Council on June 25, 1950, in regard to the agares^lon of 
North Korea. But i t i s not trust he had taken the i n i t i a t i v e within 
19 
thf? so ir l t of that Article on many occasions. 
On June 25, 1950, the Secr^tary-G neral rer lv"d an urgpnt 
ca l l from U'ashlngton that the North Korean torces ha'^  attacked 
20 
South Korea in forces. After condemning the N->rth Korean ^tt^ck* 
the Secretary-General stated that *the prstant situatl'^-^ i s a 
serious one and Is a threat to International psaco, Th^ '^«»cnrity 
Council i s . In my opinion, tho coir.petent organ to rfoal with i t . 
I consider It the clear duty of the Security Council tc tak^ s t p s 
necessary to r e s t a b l l ^ peace in that area*. 
However, the Security Council was present ;d with J unique 
opportunity to take action In a situation Involving th.^  conflicting 
IB. S.S, Goodspeed, The Nature and Function of International. 
OroanUation (New Yorkj oxford university Press, 195^), p . 35?. 
19. I b i d . , p. 356. 
20. t^.I. Millar, n. 16, p . 10. 
47 
v i t a l Interest of permanent members. A unified command under the 
\M f lag with General Mac Arthur of the US Supreme Commander was 
21 
sent to ass i s t the South Korea against the North Kotea, I t may be 
pointed out thai the "Hjreation of the unified command in Kores by 
the Security Council was possible solely because of the fortuitous 
22 
absence of the Soviet representative. Hence, i t was real ised by 
the Geneneral Assembly that to prevent matters relating to peace 
23 
and security from being "frozen" on the Security Council agenda 
which reduced to "In^otence" the Organiiation as a whole. Tt shot id 
assume the responsibil ity of the Council. Consecpjently, the General 
Assembly adopted the closely connected resolutions, the f i r s t of 
24 
v^ich i s usually termed the ^Uniting for Peace Resolution'. I t s 
intention was to create a nucleus of co l lec t ive security outside 
25 
the Security Council. I t provides, I f the Security Council because 
of the lack of the unanimity of i t s permanent members, f a i l s to 
exercise I t s primary responsibi l i ty for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security in any case where there appears to be 
a threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression, the 
Genera:, Assembly wil l consider the matter iBinedlately with a view 
to making appropriate recommendations to members for co l lec t ive 
21. A.L. Bennet, International Organization N^ew Jersey. Prentice-Hall, 
lnc.» Englewood C l l i f s , 1977); p. 1';^. 
22. D.W. Greig, n. 4 , p. 577. 
23. J . r . Starke, Introduction to International Law (London: 
Butterworths, 197?), p. (>03. 
24. D.W. Greig, n» 4 , p. 577. 
25. Paul Reuter, International Inst i tut ions (London; Georc^ Allen 
and Unwin Ltd., 195»), pp. 27b-V7. 
48 
meaturett Including ih« cas« of br«ach of peace or act of a^qresslony 
the use of araed forces ii^en necessary, to nalntaln or restore 
international peace and security* If not in session at the time, 
the General AssMbly aay nset in an energency special session 
ttfithin twenty^four hours of ^ e jrsqusst therefor .* .". 
However, Andrei G* Vyshlnsky vehenently c r i t i c i s e d a l l th» 
three resolutions. Vyshtnsky said that the Secretary.General than 
"vtould be the Coomander-ia-rhief of the artsed forces of the General 
27 
Assembly ..« riding on a Wiite horse ..«<* and def inite ly the 
resolutions strengthened the position of the Secretary*General in 
the fMintenance of peace and security* 
This transfer ..device greatly shlarged the functions and 
competence! of the General Assembly* I t i s th? important shift of 
emergency power from the veto»ridden Security Council to the vetcw 
l e s s General Asssst)ly. 
Hovtevsr, Lie's dynamic leadsrship and his support for military 
measures in tho Kore^ c r i s i s had evoked h is position and the 
Soviet Union total ly boyei<>tted him throughout the remainder of his 
tenure in office* Furthermore* the "uniting for peace resolution«* 
provides the SecretaryoGensral with ^ hc^ c powers* The resolution 
26* R.A* Falk and S.H* Mendlovltx (eds*) , n* 13, p* 251; see also 
L*M. Goodrich, E. Hanbro and A*p* Simons, Chart^s of the 
l>|ited Nations (New York, Lofidon; Coluf*ia !'niversity Press, 
27* Trygve Lie, n* 14, p* 374. 
29. I b i d , , p* 347* 
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•ftablished a c o l l t e t l v * tntasurvt contmltttte and directed i t ' in 
consultation with th« Sacreta?y-.Gen«ral and with such SKanbar 
s tates as the coonittaa finds appropriate, to study and make a 
report to the Security Cmmcil and the Genaral Asfenbly . . . on 
methods . . . vihieh nifht be used to naintain and strengthen 
international peace and security*. The ??cretary-General was also 
recruested, with the aoprovsl of the collMStive measures cTnialtftee 
to appoint a panel of nHtlltary experts **»o cotlr i^ b«> marie available, 
on request, tr member states wishing to obtain t*»chn1c.-5l advice 
regardino the oroanlnation, training and equipment for prompt 
service as United Nations units of the elements referred t o ' . 
The folloKdng discussion I s the *i l lustration of th?- use of 
sudi jd hoc powers by the Secretary-General: 
Dag HamDarskjold was a most wil l ing r presentative ox the 
General Assembly and of the Security Council in carrying out task 
30 
tf^sured to hiia, Hawnardtjold also enjoyed the couple of years free 
from major East-West c lashes. Thus, he was able to build up a 
store of confidence from both sides before circumstances forced 
on him a more iictive ro le . In the and his actions and ideas brou^t 
him and h is off lee under b i t t er attack from the representativos of 
the Soviet Union, who psreeived his claims as inimical to qreat 
power sovereignty and dominance In *»orld po l i t i c s* 
29. 5.F. Goodspeed, n, 18, pp, 349.49. 
30. D.W. Greig, n. 4 , p. 586. 
31 . H.G. Hicholas, n* I2» p . 173. 
32* AAL. Bennet, n. 21, p . 341. 
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One of Hasmarsk,iol<fte::i-Xie8t asslgnoients tha t allowed him 
sone leeway in exercising h i s dipLomatic tal«!fit3, in pur;iUd(u:t. 
of a General Asseiubly r s sc lu t ion In Dacenber, 1954, requesting him 
t o obtain the re lease of f i f teen American f ivers downtd on United 
Nations mission and imprisoned in China* The Assembly r^^n'^lution 
provided no specif ic guidel ines and permitted Hammarskjold to use 
•the means appropriate in his judgement•. Since the resolu t ion 
also condemned the Chinese ac t ion , Hammarskjold wisely decided to 
use , ins tead , as h i s basis of authori ty for a mission of Ptking, 
h i s general authori ty as Secretary-General . Although no dramatic 
announcement followed h i s four-day v i s i t , a l l the f lyers were 
33 
released within t h i s next seven months. 
However, what the most Americans believed about the effor ts 
of Hammarskjold, the New Yoric Times observed: "there ought t o be 
a feeling of g ra t i tude and sa t i s fac t ion t o thf. Secretary-Ganeral 
of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjold, for the earnest e f for t s 
he made to obtain the re lease of these men. He pursued tha t the 
£*)ligationshave been properly improved upon him. The 'Fl ight to 
Pelping' es tabl ished a mystique of success afcout the man that was 
helpful in copying with other challenges chat wer not long in 
coining. 
The Suez Canal c r i s i s of 1956 provided much broa:3er mandates 
and opportunity for the exercise of d i scre t ion and i n i t i a t i v e by 
33. I b id . Also see D.W. Greig, n . 4 , p . 586; al?o sea 
H.G. Nicholas, n . 12, p . 173. 
34. R . I . Mi l l e r , n . 16, p . 55. 
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the Secretary-General. The Council was deadlocked by British and 
French vetoes requiring an ^nargency session of the General Assembly 
35 
under the 'Uniting for Peace Resolution'. The resolution setting 
up a IMlted Nations Force authorized the Secretary-General "to 
issue regulations and instructions vvhich may be essential . . . and 
to take over the necessary administrative and executive action . . . * . 
The extraordinary powers given to the Secretary-General reouired 
36 
a real *4nargin" of confidence on the part of member s ta t e s . 
All of the guidelines, detai ls for raising a peace-keasing 
force, and the actual direction of the operations were delegated 
to Hairmarskjold by the General Assend>ly. Negotiations wdth the 
governments that were to f inish personnel as well as with the 
bel l lqerents for the vdthdrawal of their forces were necessary. 
Egypt f ina l ly agreed to the deployment of United Nations forces 
upon parts of i t s territory after I srae l ' s refusal to accept such 
an occupying group and the f i r s t UNEF troops reached Egyptian 
territory eleven days after the adoption of the General Assembly's 
resolution. A new principle evolved with the formation of the UNEF. 
Peace-keeping by a police-type force was substituted for 
co l l ec t ive security action dependent upon the might of the major 
powers. The Secretary-General directed the forces through his 
appointee, General Burns of Canada* in contrast to the earl ier 
arrangement in Korea that the United States furnish the direction 
^ 37 
of the combined forces there. 
35. A.-L. Bonnet, n. 21, p. 341. 
36. R.I. ' f i l l er , n, 1)6, p. 93. 
37. A.L. Benntt, n. 21, p. 341. 
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Hammarskjold a l to assumad responsibi l i ty for the clearing 
of the Suez Canal, «^ich had been blocked by ships sunk by the 
Egyptians. The task was completed within four months (which was 
ahead of a l l predictions) by a salvage qp>eration involving personnel 
38 
or equipment from at least eight countries. 
The Egyptian seizcire of the Suez Canal in 1956 presented 
the Secretary-General an qpportunity to employ his good off ices 
39 
to reach some con^romise among the nations most directly roncemed. 
The Hungarian cr i s i s* which occurred almost simultaneously 
with the Suez dispute and the Secretary-General was given almost 
as much authority and freedom of action in resolutions passed on 
Hungary as in resolutions passed on the Suez c r i s i s . The Assembly 
asked him "to investigate th^ situation in Hungary" on one occasion 
&nd "to take any i n i t i a t i v e he deems helpful",on another, in other 
words. Hammarskjold was given a free hand regarding he mioht 
proceed. 
The Secretary-General made two statements during this c r i s i s 
period which particularly relevant to his role in the Hungdiian 
c r i s i s : 
(1) "As a servant of the organization, the Secretary-General has 
the duty to maintain his usefulness by avoiding public stands 
38. Ib id . 
39. S.S. Goodspeed, n. 18, p. 352. 
40. R.I. r ' i l ler , n. 16, p. 150. 
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on conf l icts unlsss and until such an action might help 
to resolve the conflict". 
(2) "Wiqra the members to consider that another view of the 
duties of the Secretary-General that the one have stated 
would better se^ve the interests of the orcianlzation, i t 
i s their obvious right to act accordingly". 
Consequently, Hanunarskjold could do l i t t l e to achieve a 
po l i t i ca l settlement in Hungary. I t i s not quite correct to say 
that he was failed in arranging po l i t i ca l settlement in Hungary; 
i t i s more accurate to say that he never had a reasonable chance 
42 
for success. 
The Lebanese c r i s i s of 1958 demonstrates Hammarskjold*s 
43 
interpretation of his independent posi t ion. However, the Security 
Council created an observer group,pnited Nations Observation Group 
in Lebanon (Uf^GIL) to investigate the Lebanese complaint of 
interventicn by tne United Arab Republic in i t s internal affairs , 
A month la ter , in the face of increasing inf i l trat ion by the IJAR 
armed bands fror Syria into Lebanon and supply of arms to rebell ious 
groups incit ing the ovarthrow of the Lebanese Government, the 
Lebanese Government sought American assistance and a force of US 
44 
marines was Iwded in ttiianon. INhen the Security Council was unable 
to readh an agreement upon how the UfKXBIL should be expanded to 
41* I b i d . , pp. 150-51. 
42. Tbid.. p. 153. 
43 . A.L. Bennat, n. 21, o . 342. 
44. D.Vi. Gralg, n. 4 , p. 386. 
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nttt th« lner«Mingly striout Internal eonfltet tn Lebanon, th« 
S«eretsry-Geft«ral boldly tteppad into the "vacuum* a/nd did what 
4M 
a Japancsa resolution had proposed to do* A wove «ihtch helped in 
bringing the noiwalisation of the situation and the withdraMal 
46 
of the US troops. The Secretary«.General was very active behind the 
scenes during the Lebanase cr i s i s , particularly during the later 
phases and ha eisie out of the L^anese cr is i s with nore personal 
prestige and power than ever before. Hence, about the working of 
HsMiiarskjold in the Lebanese cr i s i s . Sir Leslie Munro said: '^ay I 
in conclusion « and I feel I am speAing for the whole Assembly -
express my answoring confidence in the great abi l i t ies of our 
distinguished Secretary«Genoral and wish him well in the discharge 
of the responsibilities which the Assembly has now entrusted to 
him. 
However, the United Nations presence In Jordan was the first 
such operation est^lished by the Secretery-G«>neral without direct 
48 
authorisation from the General Assembly or tho Security Council. 
The United Nations presence in Jordan developed "stage by staoe" 
anci! only one of the three ideas Hammarskjold originally thought of 
possible use was put into operation. The Secretary-General originally 
suggested (a) a non-nilitary United Nations presence of some sort 
in Jordan; (b) an ambassador assicfied to the United Nations heaci-
45. R.I. I^illar, n. 16, p. 206. 
46. D.w. Craig, n. 4 , p. 3B6. 
47. R.I. Millor» n. 16, p. 207. 
48. Ibid. . p. 220. 
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quarters , and (c) l i a i s o n o f f i c e s in Beirut and Damascus. Consequently, 
the major c r e d i t for the eminent success of the Jordanian success 
49 
must go t o the Secretary-General. 
Independent act ion by HMimarskjold vnas dem«r^strated by the 
s i t u a t i o n s in the dispute between Cooibodia and Thailand in 1956-60, 
and in the internal condit ions of Laos in 1959-61* In the Conbo'^lan-
Thailand dlspute*HamfflarskJold advised aqainst taking the matter t o 
the Security Council in order t o avoid any p o s s i b l e hardening of 
c o n f l i c t i n g East-West p o s i t i o n . With informed consent front the major 
powers, he appointed a personal spec ia l r epresen ta t ive , who brought 
about a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n beivneen the two countr ie s . V*»en a further 
dispute f lared up in I960, another spec ia l representat ive of the 
SecretaryfiiGeneral conducted negot ia t ions with the Combodian and 
the Thai diplomats at the IJN headquarters in New York, which led 
50 
t o the s igning of terms of se t t l ement . 
In the Laotian s i t u a t i o n , Hammarskjold twice made personal 
v i s i t s t o Laos t o urge a pos i t i on of n e u t r a l i t y in accordance with 
the Geneva agreements of 1954. Hammarskjold r e s i s t e d requests from 
the Laotian government for the establishment of a pcace-keaping 
fotrce in Laos, but fol lowing h i s second v i s i t , he appointed a 
s e r i e s of personal representa t ives , who were only temoorarily 
51 
successful in delaying the e f f e c t s of outs ide in tervent ion . 
4 9 . I b i d . . p . 221. 
50 . \,L, Bennet, n. 2 1 , p . 342. 
51 . I b i d . , pp. 342-43. 
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The Sacretary.General a lso acted on the i nv i t a t i on of the 
Government of South Afriea, t^ich refused to submit to the interven-
t ion of the Security Council in the matter of segregation po l i c i e s 
52 
but agreed to consul ta t ions of the Secretary-General. 
H«nmarskjold*s assumptions of indepimdent author i ty reached 
t h e i r highest peak and met t he i r grea tes t challenge in the Conyro 
c r i s i s of 1960u6i. In Ju ly , i960, the Secretary-General was requested 
t o provide mi l i t a ry ass is tance to the cent ra l government of the 
Republic of the Congo (Leopoldvi l le ) . In the basic mandate qlven 
t o the Secretary-General the Security Council authorized him "to 
take the necessary s t eps , in consultat ion vdth the Government of 
the lUepublic of the Ccmgo, t o provide the governmont Idth such 
mi l i t a ry ass is tance as may be necessary, u n t i l through the e f for t s 
of the Congolese government. With technical ass is tance of the United 
Nat ions, the nat ional secur i ty force may be ab le , in the opinion 
of the government, t o meet ful ly t he i r t a s k s . AdJitional quidanco 
was provided by a set of p r inc ip le s concerning the use of the Lfl 
force which had been evolved during the experience of the UNEF. The 
Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he would base 
h i s action on these p r inc ip le s subject t o t h e i r further elaboration 
as appl icable t o the Congo operat ion. \ report on the na t t e r was 
approved by the Security Council, but na tu ra l ly i t proved to leave 
gaps. In these circumstances, the Secretary-General asked the Council 
for an In te rp re ta t ion of h i s mandate (delegated powers) In the l loh t 
52. I^.A. Falk and S.H. Wendlovltz (edtjB, n . 13 , p . 316. 
53 . A.L. Bennet, n . 2 1 , p* 343* 
57 
of unforeseen events in the Congo. In the absence of further guidance, 
he was l e f t with the question how to proceed further, particularly 
whether to terminate the Congo operation ro to f i l l the gap in his 
mandate by reliance on legal factors which would allow him to answer 
outstanding questions and to impleaent the mandate in spite of no 
54 
guidance* 
However, within the Republic of the Congo, there were three 
rival po l i t i ca l groups - the Presidential group, Prime Minister 
Lumumba's group and army led by the Chief of Staff. In thase 
circumstances, the Secretary-General was confronted with the problem 
of how to implement his mandate and to whom to qive the as<;istance 
55 
stipulated in the decision of the Security Council. Hencc, because 
of the confused po l i t i ca l situation in Congo and the clash of 
external in teres t s , both the Security Council and the General \ssembly 
became increasingly inadequate, and Hammarskjold was faced with 
marking personal decisions or refusing to act at a l l . Tn assessing 
his re spons ib i l i t i e s , Hammarskjold rejected the course of Inaction. 
He declared that, instead, his decision, regardless of ofience to 
any niember s ta tes , should be based on: 
1. diarter principles and purposes* 
54, 'Dag Hammarskjold: The International Civil Servants in Law 
and in Fact' , in Gregg, R.W. and Barkun M.(eds.^, The United 
Nations System and i t s Functianlnj* SelectedJ^g^dlnos: 
see also ^,R. Falk and S.H. f/enilovltz, n. I'', p. 31". 
55, ^ . \ . Falk and S.H. Mendlovitz, n, 13, p. 319. 
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2* widely accepted legal ru l e s and precedents , especia l ly those 
found in the Unilfed Nations reso lu t ion ; 
3* consultat ion vdth the personnel of the permanent mission to 
the Ihiited Nations or with advisory committees of th 3 type 
establ ished for the IWEF and Congo opera t ions , and finAlly, 
4 . h i s own perscMial judgement based on h i s i n t e g r i t y ?nd exercise 
of conscience with self-examination concemino h i s ob jec t iv i ty 
56 
and n e u t r a l i t y . 
Howevf^r, the Soviet Union had becoma increasingly jp^lous o^ 
the success and pres t ige of the Secretary-General . They demanded 
the res ignat ion of Hammarskjold and proposed that the Secretary-
General should be replaced by a "col lect ive execucive body of the 
United Nations (Troika) comprising of three equal Secretaries-General 
- one represent ing the East , one the West, and one repvessnting 
57 
non-aligned count r ies . 
Haimnarskjold refused to resign and defended the In tegr i ty of 
58 
h i s o f f ice . The respons ib i l i ty for the Congo operation was qiv^n 
t o the Secretary-General and he reminded h i s de legates , by decisions 
of the Security Council. 
"This i s your <Toeration geltlemen. I t i s for you to indica te 
vihat you want to have done. He vvas grateful for any 'Vositive advice" 
56. \ .L . Bennet, n . 2 1 , p . 343. 
57. R . I . Mi l l e r , n . 16, pp. 297-98. 
58. A.L. Bennet, n . 21t P* 343. 
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but I f i t was not forthcoming "then I have no choice but t o follow 
my own convict ion, guided by the p r inc ip les to which I have jus t 
59 
r e f e r r ed . 
The major support received by Dag Hanrmarskjold In h i s Conqfo 
po l i c i e s from the norwallgned and uncommitted s t a t e s an-i Ind ia , for 
Ins t w e e , generally regs-rded as the leading n e u t r a l i s t at that t ime, 
invar iably supported Dag Hamroarskjold in the General Aseiribly on 
60 
the Secr^rtary-General's Congn p o l i c i e s . Hence, Hammarpk jold secured 
the authori ty he desli*ed to ' recognize ' the Congo nat ional army and 
to take Immediately a l l appropriate measures to pr^rvent the occurrence 
of c i v i l ¥iar in the Congo, including the use of fo rce . I f necessary, 
In the l a s t r e s o r t ' - an unprecedented l icence t o In t e r f e re In 
In ternal a f f a i r s . Graduallyt however, the s i tua t ion in the Congo 
relaxed and in July a nearly a l l - f ac t ion meetin.:i of the Congolese 
parliament was held under UN protect ion and establlsh«?rii an ' a l l Conoo* 
61 
government under Adoula, But the Provincial Government of Katoiqa 
refused to recognize I t s au thor i ty . 
Hammarskjold's l a s t wiscion for the United Nations w^s a trir> 
t o the Congo for the purpose of t ry lhg to medltte a settlement 
Vioise Tshombe, the head of the Katanga government, and the Premier 
Adoula of th3 cent ra l government. But on September IB, 1961, while 
Hamnarskjold on a route to crucia l meeting cone rning the forme" 
59. R . I . Mi l l e r , n . 16, p . 296. 
60 . U Thant, n . 8 , p . 35. 
6 1 . H.G. Nicholas, n . 12, p* 185. 
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Belgian Corigo, had died the day before in a plane crash near Nadola 
62 
in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). 
From 1961 to 1971, U Thant witnessed* and often act ively 
mediated, the b i t t e r controvers ies and t r ag ic confrontations that 
took place in the world. But, however, during h i s ten year torm as 
Secretary-General , he kept the support of the Big Powers snJ acted 
as a spokesman on the i t sue of greatest concern to the dev lopina 
na t i ons . Throughout h i s tenure of o f f i ce , he vtas plagusi by the 
f inancial c r i s i s that the uembers were unable 6r unwilling to 
reso lve . He played a construct ive role in the p o l i t i c a l disputes 
such as those Involving the Congo,Cyprus, West I r i a n , the Arab-
I s r a e l i war of 1967 and the Cuban miss i le c r i s i s . He was c r i t i c i s e d 
in some quar te rs for the rapid withdrawal of the JJ'NEF forces from 
the Middle East in 1967. He was outspoken but i ne f i ec t ive in t ry ing 
63 
to bring an end t o Vietnam War. During the course of dispute between 
the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia over Yemen, thr Secretary-
General took the i n i t i a t i v e In arranging a cease f i r e , and art h i s 
own re spons ib i l i t y sent observers in checking on conmliance. Tn 1970, 
the Secrptary-General U Thant was asked by Iran and tha T^nHed 
Kingdom to exercise h is good offices with a view to ascer ta ining 
the wishes of th<3 people to Bahrain with respect to th~- futu^-e 
s t a tu s of the I s l ands . The conclusion of the Secretary-General 's 
personal representa t ive that tha people of Bahrain desired Independence 
62 . U Thant, n. 8 , p . 3 . 
63 . A.L. Bennet, n . 21 , p . 344. 
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was accepted by Iran and the United Kingdom, and subsequently 
64 
r a t i f i e d by ths Security Council* 
U Thant played an important r o l e in the India- P ^ i s t a n 
conf l i c t in 1965. The Security Council was asked t o "exert every 
Dossible e f fo r t " to bring about a cessat ion of h o s t a l i t l e s . he took 
a bold i n i t i a t i v e and suggested that the Security Council order-sd 
the tvw governments to a e s i s t from furtha'? h o s t a l l t i e s and warns J 
that i f they fa i led to comoly, the Council would take action under 
Ar t ic le 39 of the Charter . The pa r t i e s acceded to the Council 's 
demand for a cease f i r e . U Thant was asked to provide the necessary 
65 
as i s tance t o ensure supervision of the cease f i r e . 
Further , in general , U Thant Tiainta5.ned ths p r inc io les 
es tabl ished by Lie and Hanmarskjold and j u d i c i a l l y exercised the 
previously establ ished preroga t ives . 
U Thant*s successor, Kurt Waldheim continued aiono a similar 
l i n e . He believed that the 1975 i s c ruc ia l for West /\sia. Accor^'ing 
t o him, i t would be the monent of decision between war anr^  oeare In 
West Asia. He was confident about the U^T's peac^-keepinq effor ts 
in resolving the d i spu tes . He favou'ed the renewal of th<^  mandate 
of UN disengagement observer force which was to expire on Nov. robe'" 30, 
1974. v/aldheim stressed that there could be no sat isfact '^ry se t t l«nent 
of the West Asia conf l i c t unless the problem of Pa les t in ians was 
66 
resolved. 
64^ See Report of the Secretary-General on the Woiic of the Organisa-
t i o n . 16 June 1969 - 15 June 1970 (GA. 0'^. 25th Ses8ion,Suppl.l) , 
pp. /0 -74 . 
65 . A.L. B ^ n e t , n. 21* p . 344. 
66 . The Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , November 20, 1974. 
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The Secretary-6en«ral, Kurt Waldh«ln,w«s confident about 
the future peace-keeping role of the United Nations. In contemporary 
world p o l i t i c s , an important role for the Secretary.Ganeral i s 
highly desirable. 
The present Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, 
since 1982, i s quiatly trying to do his best to reduc«? tansions in 
the areas of conf l i c t s . He v i s i ted South Africa and consulted the 
South Afrlcafi leaders, met in Cape Town with internal party leaders 
and wilh the leadership of SW^ PO in Angola so that Issues regarding 
the implemei tation of UN independence plan for Namibia cwld be 
ImpleiBented, without vi*»lch real procffess could not be claimed. 
He wants that Impatience of Namlbian people v*io ^^ ere suffering not 
only for their denial of their leqitlmate aspirations for qalnlrg 
self-determination . . . and uncertainty about thfcir future •• could 
67 
lead to disastrous resu l t . The 'Proximity Talks' between Mohan's tasi 
and Pakistan arranged by hi» held many meetings t i l l now. The 
Secretary-General through his representative, who i s actlno as 
go-between,trying to solve Afghanistan c r i s i s , has also reduced 
tensions in a l l areas of conf l i c t s . 
However, i t i s not altogether easy to explain the role of the 
Secretary-General in the f i e ld of international peac^ ftnd security. 
To an extent, the Secretary-General's role d :^>ands upon the 
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personality of the holder of the of f ice . 
67. m Vlaakly Newsletter (New Delhi: TJN Information C^nLre), Vol.:34, 
No. 32, September 9, 1983. 
68. D."?. Greig, n. 4 , p. 587. 
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Within the restr ict ions placed upon the role of the Secretary-
General by the present international s i tuat ion, the Secretary-General 
has an Important part to play as a spokesman for the United Nations. 
Hs was able to act axtemally on behalf of the organisation and 
Internally as a make-weight in the balance of weight b«?tween the 
69 
major powers. 
However, Article 99 of the UN ai^rter, which gives hira this 
r ight , l i e s not so much in the specific powers that i s ai^en as i t s 
implication that the Secretary-General, unlike his League counterparts, 
Is to have an ^mnortant responsibil ity for making the Organization 
affective In i t s primary purpose - the maintenance of internatioial 
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peace and security. 
Apart from the powers that are given to the Secretariat by the 
expl ic i t provisions of the Charter, the Secretary-General has, as the 
head of one of the principal organs, asserted the right an-' duty to 
tadce certain i n i t i a t i v e s to achieve the purpose of the Organization, 
particularly in the maintenance of peace and security, in this 
connection, he has offered his services as a mediator when such an 
offer , in his judgement, i s l ike ly to provide an acceptable procedure 
for the settlemant or acccmmodation of an exist ing dispute or 
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tension. 
69. Ibjld.. p. 387. 
70. L.^ .^ Goodrich, The United Nations in Oianalnq World (New York; 
Columbia University Press, 19^4), p. 83. 
71. I b i d . , p. 94. 
CONCLUSION 
Undtr Ui« Chart*^ tti« Socratdry-^entral i s th« ehl*f 4NJminls-
t r « i l v t officer of ih« United Nations. In that capacity, h« i t 
rospontibi* for ttcuring th« hlghost standards of • f t l c lency , 
eompatenca and InttQrity throuohout the Saeretarlat. Ha should ba 
reQardad as the head of a staff of International f l v t l Sarvants, 
«iho trm not to b# Influenced In the p.^rfcrtBjnce of their duties by 
national, l(^eoloHlr'»l or personal consideration of any klnH, *0>€9 
a member of the Secr<?tarl8t Is influenced In aiy way by any authority 
eirterml to the Orcjanlzatlon, he e^asss to be a truly International 
Civil Servant. Article 100 of th<? UN Chtirter provi-les that "^ n the 
performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall 
not seek or receive instructions froa any qovarnsii^nt or frosi any 
authority external to the Organization. They shall r-fraln tram any 
action wi ch night ref lect on their pet i t ion as in temat lo 'a l o f f i c ia l s 
responsible only to the Organization*'. 
Undoubtedly9 an international o f f i c ia l i s not expected to 
9ive up h i s private opinions on national prejudices but he i s asked 
to subordinate to the interest of the United Nations so long as he 
i t a moiiber of the Secretariat. I t i s the duty of the Secretaty. 
General to ensure that the persomiel of the Secretariat do not 
deviate fra» the noriss «id prtnclples of the International r l v l ! 
service. 
Th* IndeT^endence and international character of the ^^errotarlat 
requires not only resistdncf?* but also MI independent isnplp»*ntat1ir. 
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of c can trover s i fil po l i t i c 1 doeli^iont. In a matt«r fully consistent 
«d.th thfc; Qxcluslvely international r«8pontiblUty oi the Sfttretoriat. 
Furthert th« administrative respontibi l l ty of the s«crstery. 
G^aral undar ^ t i e l a 97 involvat tha asstfitial tasks of '^reparlno 
tha ground for tha daelsions of the organs and of "eKecutinq** t h ^ 
in eooparation with the nanbars. His aar,in 1 straitiv^ functiors maka 
hi« tha chiawial of cooaiunlection bat«ra«»n the mevibars and tha orqeans 
of the United Watio^s, He nwst supervise tha p'"eparati'>n ot work 
for coordinating tha idLdaspread ac t lv i t ia s of thv Uniterm K'aticns. 
No other organ or s f t i c i a l i s in tt& Scoa position as the Serri^t ry-
Ganaral as tar as the over-all integration i s concerned. This i s 
particularly trua with respect to bringing the SpecldiizQd Agonclos 
into relidtlonship tdth the United Nations* Ths Sacrstary-Gmineral 
has the responsibil ity for saaing that necassary sucr«tiirldl s^rvlc<3S 
orovldad for th- Genersl Assenbly, the Securi;.y Council, cr f , 
the Trusteeship Council and the larg<» number of subsidiary org^^ns 
and spcci<»i bodies set up to do the work of tha United NatKn-ss. Tn 
addition, he i s responsible for di'-ecting mr^ supervl sing a wldo 
rangfi of technical services "iurh BS tha preparation of background 
paper, th^ ^ preparation of r'.'ports ani periodic ?! oubUcstlons, an^l 
a nultituda of other spaeial tectmieal task* which th«» Ser-etarlat 
sjay be asked to perform by th? Gsnaral Assenbly or the '"ouncil. 
Furthe nor , he Is responsible for pe-sonnel administration, ineludino 
appointments, promotions and disciplinary action. He must oversee 
the ad>rlnistr<ition of the finances of the Organization. 
However, the c ^ t r a l responsibil ity for achieving e<>ordination 
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of tho r)ollcl%s and ac t iv i t i e s of th» Unltad Nations I t s e l f and 
the various Special!29d Agenclat Is placad on the General ''.ssawbly 
and the Econoalc and Social Council, aetlnQ undar I t s authority. 
In practice^ It has baen found that the aiajor part of this respon. 
a l b l l l t y should ha dalagated to the Sacratary^Gmaral. Thus, his 
r e tpont lh l l l t l a t at chief coordinator are of the greatest importanre 
In naklng the Organlgatlon affective In daalli'io with th '^ vdde ran^e 
of acononlc* social and technological problens wihtch a'<i*.UHie increased 
Inportancs with each passing day. 
However, Articl« 97 Is followed by Arttclsp 9S 3nri ^9. VMcle 
9^ of th« UN Charter p- ovldas t h a f t h j Secret3ry-C?^ner J1 shj l ! <?ct 
In that capacity In a l l Meetings of the General Assembly, of th-
Security Cooncll, of the iccsncraic tjnd Social round I, and -^  I the 
Trusteeship CouncU and shall perforoi 8u<-h other functions as «3T-a 
entrusted to bl» by these organs. The Serrvt-ry-C nsr;l s h . l l make 
an annual report to the General Assembly en th<^  work of th'- Croanij*-
t l on ." Tn adHitlcn Article 97 provides t h a f t h t Tor retrry-^ ner 4 
way brlno to the attention of the Security rouncU any real tor Wn ch 
in his onlnlon "^ ay threaten tha malntenanc- of Intrrnatloral ooace 
ani security*". The effect of Artlfle 99, i»«h*n coupl-^i vdth %rtlrle 98, 
I s to give the 5ecr<»tary-Gene'^al an Important posit ion, finest that 
of an a-^dltlonal wtjwber of the f^ecurlty rcuncil (th'^doh not v-^tlnq 
Sternberg. Try^ve Lie wrote of '^^•tlele 99 that i t confer-ed upon the 
Secretary-Gt^neral, no represent a tlva of a slnole net! en, ev«r. ha** 
before. Hence, the Sere ta-'y.Gone'-al,under Article 99 of th*^  rharter. 
Is also a high pol i t i ca l of f icer . In that capacity he nay take the 
lead m dealing with matters that nay threaten the maintenance of 
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int9m«tional p^ie* and security* Thus, according to Artlcl* 99» 
the Secr«tary«0«n«ral i t given a double discretion. 
Legal scholars have observed that Article 99 not only confers 
upon the Secretary-General a right to bring natters to the Security 
Council but also that th i s right carries i«ith i t by necessary 
inpl leat iont a broad discretion to conduct enquiries and to enoaoe 
in infonaal diplsoiatie act ivity in this regard to eiatter* ^<ch may 
threaten the Maintenance of internet!on«l peaee end security. 
I t i s the Secr«tary-G«n«ral*s broadar po l i t i ca l powers ^h^ch 
provide Uie contrast between %h» role of the United Nations Serr t^ry-
General and that of the League Secretary General. That the Seer t:>ry« 
General should have broader po l i t i ca l role w«s clearly desired by 
those who wrote the Charter, but what was not and could net be 
anticipated was Uie exact f o n that role would assuae. Th^ Secretary. 
General repras^ts the Crganisatlon in i t s relations with laeaibar 
govemnents and i t s external relations generally. In h i s relation 
wiUi •enbar govemm^ts, he serves as a useful S'^irce of Infoimatlon, 
and advis<Mr, and a stimilator of po l i c i e s and action in supnort of 
the United Nations ourposes and principles. Tn addition, fomal 
•greenents w i ^ govemnents and other organixations are concluded 
by the Secr^taryU^eneral, althot^gh as a rule they require the 
approval of tY^ General Asseicbly* 
The Secretary-General also acts as a spokessian of the Organisa-
tion in r^oorting on i t s w r^k and aiaking suggestions for i t s oreatt^r 
effectiveness* 
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HMnartkield Mfhatltcd th« concept of the S«cretaiy^«i«ral 
• t n h t trusted consultantt of «U tld«f •• H« tan the EMUWast 
conf l ic t as the tttpr«i« challcngo confrontinQ tho Orqanisation. 
Tho Secr9t«ry«6flnoral was indispensable as tha "link** batwaan Fast 
and li»st OTd ha should not nix into tha affairs of ncsibar s ta tes . 
Consaquantly, the Sacratary«<3enar«l plays a v i ta l rola in the 
maintanance of international peace and security. Ho«i«ver» thc^  primary 
responsibi l i ty for the siaintenanee of peace and security ha^ been 
9iven to the Security Council and the neeiber s tates of the United 
Nations have agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council. But cming to excessive use of ve to , matters relatfnq 
to peace and security fron being "frozen* on the Security Council 
agenda vdilch reduced to "in^otance** the Organization as a .hole. 
In fact , only once in the history of the United Nations, tho Security 
Council could take co l l ec t ive action (Korean c r i s i s ) and iht t , too, 
only of the absence of Soviet ^ S f l a which was boycotting tha 
Security Council masting« I t v>as then realized by the General As^ e^tnbly 
and the G<»ner^ l fsss^bly passed three c lose ly coiwectod re«iolutlons| 
the f i r s t of viilch i s usually teraed the MJnltlng for '^ eace- l^esolutlon* 
I t s intc^ntlcHn was to create a nucleus of co l lec t ive security out«ide 
the !^eeurity Council. Definitely» the resolution strenpthened the 
posit ion of tha Secretary^eneral. Tt Is a transfer-device and » 
shi f t of po«wrs fro« the veto-ridden Security Council to the veto-
l e s s General As«aBA»ly. This strengthened the positicM^ of the 'Security 
Council as the burden of peace-haer^ing under the authority of the 
General Aasenbly l i e s on the shoulders of thu Secr-tary-General. 
69 
Tht SseretaryuGsnaral has b?ron« the^  key.>ftgure In tht l^ * 
c r i s i s diplonacy. He has becom* th« rantral flour« in almost all 
tha im paaea-4t9epinQ oparattont. The SacrataryuGnnaral has to perform 
a vary d i f f i cu l t job rathar "the most i»poa«ibla" job !n the worlf!. 
Such a parson i t appoint ad by the Hanaral Aa«a«ibly on tha 
racosnandation of tha Sacurity Council. Tha coneurrance of tha 
Paxaanant Manbart waa mada conpulsory. Tha practice has basn for 
tha Sacurity Cmmcil to agrea lip&n a Candida e and for the Atsanbly 
to ^point th*t e<mdidata* In affact» tha Sacrstary-C»naral i s the 
Paxvanant Mambaii* ^oaalnaa". Consaquantly* thaxd i s hlnderanca 
in parfoxDing his job affactiv«lyt af i ic iant lyt impartially and 
indepandently* 
v^anevar, the S ac rt ttry-^S en a ^ al takas d c l s l cns ^h'^eh injures 
tha interest of any of th- Big niv<t, h© becomas Iho victlr^ of th Ir 
cr i t ic i sm. Tha T^ssian i»*sulte"1 th« f i r s t ??ar'.itary-Gcner3l parsonally, 
an^ boycottsd hi?i sce ieUy and o f f i c i a l l y . Th'^  "'^'^ '^ as also not 
happy with '^ ao Hanwiarskjold, thf» s-^ccnd <?orr&t ry-CLnaral. Th«y also 
w»»tad his r«?n!nval and atfvocated *Trolka* pr<»^o««l to abolish the 
post '>f tha Sacratary-Gena'sl. 
In fact . Iron tha beginning of tha proc&dura t i l l the cnemle-
tion oi tha tenure* tha Sacrotary^Gfenaral f i r s t c^ s a cvnHldate t^id 
tht^ n as the occup«it of tho of i iee acts under great strains and 
bahavas with much restrains . 
The Sacratary<»G^araI i s assigned to be a c s« tr . l rol« as .in 
attoinistrator and as a laadar. Tha intaxnational charactax, Ioyiilt.y 
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m6 ind«o«nd«rBe of tht 8«cr»tariat i s fundanantal to tho •ffoctlvo-
noss of «n international tarvlea and i t la th« ^uty of tha Sarretary-
Ganaral to anaura i t «ihlch in turn «dll halp dlnlnlsh world tanalon . 
Oonaa<|U0itly9 tha Saeratary«Genaral la ajtpactad to play a vary 
lapmptMit xolt for a haalthy» happy «id proaparoua Intamatlonal 
aoclaty. Qlnfloutly» ttieh a paraon (Sacr«tary«G«nar«l) should not 
only ba a "nonlnaa" of tha Big Giva. Logically, i t haa barona 
naeaaaary In the intaraat of international aoeiety to mwn^ 
Artiela 97. Tha aaandnant should ba 99^9 on tha "Author!ty-eunu 
ABrountablUty* baaia so that ha could function faarlassly, 
indapandantlyi africiantly and impartially. 
A P P E N D I X 
vffffii? mi^ 9\^m 
VE THE PaOPlBS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETEfMINEO 
to tflir* tyeettdlng gentratlont froa tht teour^e of ««r, which 
tide* in our l i f« t i« t h«s brought untold sorrow to nand» and 
to f&iiim f«lth in fundamttnt«l hunan rights, in the dignity 
and worth of tho hunan porson. in th« oqusl rights of nsn snd women 
and of nations Is'go and snail» snd 
to tstablish conditions undsr which iust ies and raspset for 
tha obligations arising frosi traatias and othar sourcas of intar. 
national law can ba siaintainadt and 
to proBOta social prograss and battar standards of l i f e in 
laf^ar fraadosit 
/NO FOK THB«B 9lnS 
to praetisa tolarane* and liva together In peace with one 
another »§ good neighbours, and 
to unite our strength to aalntaln intennationdl peace «nd 
security, and 
to ensure* by the acceptance of principles and thr Institution 
of aethods, that aiswd force shall not be used, save in the conmon 
interest, and 
to as^loy inteznati onal aathinary for the prostotlon of the 
acononic Btsi social advancenent of all peoples, 
H/VE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUP EFPDRTS TO C^CMPLISH THtSE f^%S 
Accordingly, our respective Govexnments, through representatives 
assuBbled in the City of Sm Francisco, who have axhibited their 
full powars found to ba in good and due fom, have agreed to the 
?resent Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an nteznational ocrganisation to be known as tha United Nations. 
CHAPTER I , PURPOSES /WD PWIMCIPLES 
Article 1 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
!• To nalntai^ intt^mbtlonal peace and security, «irf to that end: 
to taka affective collective maasures for the prevention and rem^ Tval 
of threats to the peace, Md for th<» suppression of acts of ao^ r^esfu. 
ion or other breaches of the peace, and to brlnr about by peaceful 
•asns, and in conformity with tha principles of justice and Inter. 
national law, adjustnant or settlement of international disputes 
or situations which night lead to a breach of the peace; 
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2* To dtvalop frigidly relAtions anong nations bMtd on rstptct 
for the prlnclplo of equal rightt and 8«lf«>d«t«xiRlnatton of peoples, 
md to take other approprlAe neasures to strengthen universal peace; 
3* To achlsfve international co-operation in solving international 
problesis of an ecanomic» soc ia l , culturel , or hunanltarian character, 
and in proBoting and encouraging respect for hunan rights and for 
fund«iental freedons for al l wi thout dist inction as to race, sex, 
language, or rel igion; and 
4 . To be a centr« for haxnoniiing the actions of nations in the 
attainment of these conmon ends* 
Article 2 
Th* Organisation and i t s Mesibers, in pursuit of the Purposes stated 
in Article 1, sh al l act in accordance «fith the follovrlng Principles} 
1. The Organization i s based en the principle of the soverelom 
equality of al l I t s Mesibers. 
2. All Members, in ordar to ensure to al l of them the rights 
and benefits resulting from membership, shall f u l f i l In good faith 
the obllnations sassumed by them In accordance with th6> nre«ent 
^ a r t e r i 
3. All Msmbert shall t a t t l e their internet 1 onal disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that in temat i onal peace and 
security , and Just ice , are not endangered. 
4 . All Members shall refrain In their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the terr i tor ia l integrity 
or polit icci l ind4^>«ndenee of any f t a t e , or in any other maivier 
inconsistent sdth the Purposes of the United Nations. 
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance 
i n any action i t takes in accordance with the present charter, 
and shall refrain from giving assistance to any State against which 
the United Nations i s taking preventive or enforcement action. 
6 . The Organization shall ensure that States which are not 
Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles 
so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of inteimational peace 
and security. 
7. Nothino contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to Intervene In matter* vlilch are es<tentlally within 
the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall reoulre the Metnbe'^ s 
to submit such natters to settlement under the pre^^ent Charter* but 
th is principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
me^aures under Chapter V7T. 
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CHAPTEB XX. MBKBEBSHIP 
Artlcl* 3 
Th« original Mosbers of th« United Nations ihal l ba tha s u i a a which, 
having partlcipatad In tha IMltad Natlont Confar«nce on Intematlonai 
Organisation at San Franclteot or having pravlously tlqnad the 
Oaelaration by Unltad Nations of January i» 194$, sign th^ orasent 
rtiartar and ratify i t In aceordenca with Article 110. 
Artlela 4 
! • Mcmbarshlp In tha imUad Nations Is open to all other pQarc^ 
loving s tates it^lrh accept th» oblfgetlons contained In the pre»«»nt 
Chartert and. In the judgment of th« Organ!xation, are able and 
xrtlllng to carry out these (^l igat ions. 
2. The adailselonsi ©f any such State to ei^etbership In the United 
Nations will be affected by a decision of the O^n^rf^l Assembly uron 
the recormandatlon of the Security Council* 
Article 5 
A nembar of the United Nations against which prev ntlve or enforce-
stent action has been taken by the Security Council may be suteended 
iron the exarclse of the r l ^ t s and privileges of mefrbership by the 
General Mssnbly tq>an the recommendation of the Security CouncU. 
The exarelsa of those rights and prlvllaqes may be restored by the 
Security Council* 
/xt lc le b 
A {^ ar.ber of the Uhlted Nations which has persistently violated the 
Principles conta Insd In the present Charter may be expelled from the 
Organisation by the Genardl Assembly upon the recommandatlcn of the 
Security Council. 
rHApTEP III . Qvcms 
Artlcls 7 
1. There are <»stablished as tt»e principal organs of the "nit«»d 
Nationst a Genarel Assembly, a Security Council, an r-ronomlc m'^ 
Social Cowncll, a Trusteeship Council, an InteTnati ^al rourt of 
Justice, and a ^Secretariat. 
3. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necr>s«ary may be 
est^Hshed In accordance with the present 'barter. 
Article 8 
The United Nations shall place no restrict!'^^ns on the e l la lbl l i ty 
of men and woman to participate in any rapacity and under condlti'>ns 
of eguality In i t s principal and subsidiary orc.'^s. 
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CHAPTER IV. rm GmuwL fipsomvf 
Artlcl* 9 Coapesltien 
i . Th« G«n«ral Atytmbly shall eentltt of all th« li«nb«rs of the 
UniUd Nations. 
2* Each MfHbor shall hav« not nora than five raprasantatlvas In 
tha 6«naral Assaaibly. 
Functions mi Powars 
Artiela 10 
jha Canaral Assanbty nay discuss any quastions or any mattars within 
tha seopa of tha prasant fhartar or ralatlnq to the powars and 
funetiont of any oraans providad for in the pra«ant rhartar, an^, 
axcapt as providad in Artiila 1?, may MAO racomman'jatlons to th«> 
Masibars of Vti9 Unitad Nations or to tha Saeurity r4>uncll or to both 
on any surh (luastions or nattars. 
Artiela 11 
1. Tha Ganaral Assaably oiay eonsidar tha ganaral prinriola*! of 
cooparatlon in the sialntananea of intarnational paaea and sarurlty* 
including tha prlnciplas govaminQ disaxaaBant mnd Uta r gulatlon 
of anttfunts, and nay aaka rficomsundations with r^ oarc^  to surh 
prineiplas to tha Manbars or to tha Sscurity Council or to both. 
2« Tha Ganaral Assambly may discuss any questions ralatlng to 
tha aaintananca of intarnational paaca and saeurity brought batora 
i t by any Maabar of tha Unitad Nations, or by tha Saeurity Council, 
or by a Stata vrftlch i s not a Mtabar of tha Unitad Nations in accordanca 
«dth Artiela 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, 
may nake r-^comeandctions with regard to any such gu^stlons to the 
State or States coneexned or to the Security council or to bcth. 
Any such question, on «^!d» action i s necessary, shall be referred 
to tha Security Ccuncil by tha General Assaably either before or 
after discussion. 
3* Tha General Asseaibly aay call the attention of the Security 
Council to tfltuatlons which are likely to endangar int(>matlonal 
peace an'f security. 
4 . The powers of the General Assembly set forth In this Article 
shell not limit the general scope of Article 10. 
Artiela 12 
1. Whila the Security Cotrscfl i s axeretsing in respect of any 
dispute or situation the furwtlons as^lfned to It In th'' pre-ent 
Charter, the General Assembly ^ a l l not make any rerorfnendetfon w1 h^ 
regard to that dispute or situation unles^i the Security Council 
so requests. 
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2* Th« SctrtUxy-Gttntftlt with th« content of th« Sacurlty Council. 
th«l l notify the GenoraX Assombly at each session of any matters 
re lat ive to the nalntfn«iee of intematlonal peace and security which 
airt being dealt with Wf the Security Council Bnd shall similarly 
notify the General Assanbly* or the Meabors of the United Nations 
i f the Genoral Msanbly i s not in sosslon^ ianediately the Security 
Council eeoset to deal «ilth such iRattert. 
Article13 
1, The General Assembly shall i n i t i a t e studies an? make reco "nenHa-. 
t ions for th«o purpose ofs^ 
(a) pronotino inteTnational eo»operation in the po l i t i ca l f i t id m'^ 
eneouraQUiQ the progressive develepeient of int^?nat1^nal law 
m<^ i t s codification} 
(b) pronoting intemational co»operation in the econoair» sorta l , 
cul tural , educational, anc^  health f i e ld* , and as t i s t ino in tti9 
real i tat ion of huwan rights and fundamental freedoms for al l 
without dist inction as to race, sex, language, or re l ig ion . 
?• The further ftp o n s i b l l i t i e s , functions, and powers of the 
Genoral Assoaiily with respect to matters mentioned In paragraph 1(b) 
above are set forth in CJiapters TX and X. 
Article 14 
Subject to the provisions of Article X2» the General Assembly nay 
recomssnd measures for th^ > peaceful adjustment of any s i tuat ion, 
regardless ol origin, which i t deems l ikely to impair the ^neral 
welfare or friendly relations among nations, Uicludlng situations 
resulting from a violat ion of the provisions of the present Charter 
sett ing forth the Purposes ^ d Principles of the United Nations. 
Article 15 
1* The Genoral Assembly shall reraive and consider annual ann 
special reoorts from the Security rounci l | these -eoorts shall !'>r!uHe 
an account of the measures that the Security founcil has derided 
upon or taken to maintain intematior^al peace «nd security. 
?• The General Assembly i^all receive and consider r ^ c r t s from 
the other organs of the United Nations. 
Article 16 
The General Assembly ^ a l l perforn; such functions with re<^o9ct to th^ ^ 
international trusteeship syst'^m as are as«ianed to ft under rhai^ t'^ '' 
yil andXITI, including the approval of th» trusteeship aqreements 
for areas not designated as strategic* 
Article 17 
1. The General Assembly shall consider and afiprove th^ budget of 
the Organisation. 
n 
2* Tht •]iptns«t of the Ofajnlzatlon shall be home tif the Menbert 
at apportioned by the Genoral AManbly. 
3* The Gonoral Asseably shall consldar and approve any financial 
and budgetary arranganents «lth special tied agencies referred to 
in Article 57 and shall exaains the aaBlnistrstive budgets of surh 
specialised agencies with a view to aAing recosffiendatlons to the 
agencies concerned* 
Voting 
Article 18 
1. Rach Mweber of the C^neral Assembly thbll h«vc> one vote. 
?. r^eeisions of the General Assembly on iwoortant questi^s s^all 
be nade by a two»^trds najorHy of the Monbcrs pre«ent m'* vttlnq. 
These qucstl:ns shall Include: reeomBwidations with re<sDect to the 
maintenviee of int^xnatimal psace and security* the election of th^ 
non^ptmanent nenbers of the Security rouncilg the electlf>n of thp 
members of the Eecnoede and Social Council, the election of n<^bo^^ 
of the Trusteeship Council In accordance with paragraph 1(c) of 
Article M« the a<Ms<-lon of new Veabftrs to the United Nations* the 
su^>ension of tha rights and privlleres of wewbershln* the exoulslor 
of Manberst questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship 
system, and budgetary questions* 
3* Decisions on other questions* including the det^jreilnatlm of 
additional categories of questions to be decided by a two.t^lrde 
najoxity* shall be aade by a Majority of the Manbers pre«ent and 
voting. 
Article 19 
A Maaber of the United Nations vhlch i s in arrears in the paynant of 
i t s financial contributions to the Org«ilzatlon shall have no vote 
m the Gener al Asssnbly If the anount of Its arrears equals or exceeds 
the anount of the contributions due froai i t for the preceding two 
full years. The General Assembly may* nevertheless* permit such a 
Monber to vote if i t is satisfied that the failure to pay is ^ue to 
conditions beyond the control of the Maaber. 
Procedure 
Article TO 
The General Assaably shall meet In regular annual ses«l ns an^ i In 
such speclall sessl<^ns as occa'^lon may renulre. 5Jp«cl 1 «<esslons 
shall be convolced by the •^ecr^taryaOene'-al at th' rpfni**st o<^  the 
Security Council or of a majority of the »»e«bers of th«» ^'nlted Mat* ^« . 
Article 21 
The Genordl Assembly shall adopt i t s own rules of pr'^ ceiur®'^ * It shall 
elects i t s Prettldent for each session. 
T7 
Article 92 
Th« G«n«ral Asttnbly aty Mtibltt l i toeh subsidiary organs as I t desms 
nscsssary for the perfofnanca 9t I t s functions* 
CH^ PTEP V. THE SErjmTY (TMUm 
Conpotltion 
Artiela 23 
1 
1. Tha Saeurlty Council shall consist of f i f teen vanbers of the 
IMitad Matlons. Tha '^apubtlc of China, Frwic?, tha 'Inlon of Soviet 
Soc ia l i s t Bapubllcs. tha Unltad Klnodon of Croat Sri tain and "orth'>m 
Iraland, and tha Unltad States of America shall be permanj^ nt m^nbors 
of the Security Council. The General Assenbly shall e lect ten other 
Menbers of the United Nations to be norwpersMnent members '^^the 
Security council , due regard belno special ly paivi. In the f irs t 
instance, to the contribution of Wembers of the Un^tai '^atl'ns to 
the malnteflaneo of Intemctl^nal peace and security and to the oth^-
purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical 
distribution. 
2. The nen.perBi«isnt raesibers of the Security Council shall be 
elected for a texsi of two years. In the f i r s t election of the non. 
pemanent meeibers after the Increase of the membershlo of the 
Security Council from eleven to f i f t een , two of the four ^ir'rltlcnal 
nembers shall be chosen for a term of one yoar. A retiring mtnaber 
shall not be e l ig ib le for Intnedliate ra-e lect ior . 
3. Each moBber of the Security Council shall have cne ^^^ .re'^'Ot ?tlve. 
Functions and Powers 
Artlclo 24 
1, Tn or^er to wsure pron^Jt and effect ivo ^ t l o n by the "nlteH 
Nations, i t s l^edibers confer on the *;eeurlty Council oriinary re^non-
s i b l l i t y for the naintsnance of intematlonal peace and «»»»urlty. 
«id agree that in carrying out i t s duties undsr this re«t)'^slbi'lty 
the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2. Tn discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in 
fccordance with the Purposes and Principles of the iJn?ted Nations. he specif ic powers granted to the Security Council for the discharfie 
of these duties ere laid down in Chuptars VI, VIT, v i n , and yiT. 
el^ As amended, the original text ot Article 23 reads a» follows} 
1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven Vembtsrs of the 
United Nations, Th« Republic of China, France, the Union of 
Soviet Socia l i s t Republics, the United Kingdoa of Creat Britain 
and Northdzn I r e l ^ d , and the United Statc«^ of -'mericc: shall 
be pexsianent neiBbers of the Security Council. Ttke General 
Assenbly shall e lect s ix other Members of the United K^ations to 
be non^penianent members of the Security Counci l , . . . *« (Contd.) 
J . / . / 
3 . The Security rounell shall tu te l t annual anH, when nectssary, 
special reports to the General Assembly for I t s const^eratlon. 
Arttclt 3J5 
The Menbers of the United Nations agree to accept and carry ^ t th& 
decls l -^s of the Security Council In accordance with the present 
Charter. 
Article S( 
Tn order to prosiote the e^tabllshwent and maintenanee nf internetl^'^al 
peace and security with the least dWerslon for amament^ 'sf the 
world*s huaan and econoeilc re«ouree«t the Security rounell "^hall 
ba responsbia for fonoulating, with the as*^istance of the ^llit-^ry 
Staff Cooaittee referred to In Article 47» plans to be 8ub<T«Ut«9'> to 
the kSenbers of the UnUed Wations for ttie p«tabUsh«»ent -^ f a $y«t:ew 
for th<^  r^gul^tlon of aneanents, 
"^2) Voting 
Article :ff 
1. LAch aeciber of the Tgctrity Council shall havf? one vote. 
2. Decisions of the Security Cwncll on procedurel matter* shall 
be made by an afflmatlve! vote wmU of f^^f^s aembers. 
3 . Decisions of th<£ Security council on a l l other rnettirs shUI 
be made iff m affiznativa vota of nine members Including th** c^^currin-
votes of th^ psitsanent neffiber«} provided that. In decisions under 
Chapter VI» and under paragraph 3 of Artlrle 52, a party to a d!sr'.<te 
shddl abstain frem votino. 
2« The non«pamanent inerRbers of th*- f^ecurlty Council shall be 
eleetf^d for a terB of two yoars. Tn the f i r s t election cf non-ppr'?»ani»nt 
neeibsrs* however* three shall be chosen for a term of rn9 year. ^ 
ret iring nesibsr shall not b* e l i g in l e for iawedlate re-elpctlon. 
3* Each aienber of th« Security Cwmcll shall have -^e repre«entstive 
2^ As amended, the • s lg ina l text of Article S7 reads as follows:-
**!• ciach meabar of th<* Security Council shall have one vote* 
2* Decisions of th« Security Council on prxsedural matters shall b© 
aiade by an affine^tive vote of seven n.^ iabers* 
3 . Decisions of the Security Council on a l l other matters shall be 
made by an affiroative vote of seven member? Including the 
concuiring votes of th patiiafient nembers;provided that, in 
decisions under Chapt^ r^ VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, 
a party to a dispute shall abstain frosi voting". 
Article Sfi 
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Proctdur* 
1. Th« Security Council th«ll b« so organized at to be abl« to 
funttlon continuously. £ach nenbcr of th« Socurlty council shall 
for th i s purposs be represontod at all t ines at the seat ot the 
Organization* 
2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetinqs at which 
each of i t s aeffibers nay, If It so desires* be rapxe^erxt^d by a 
nsember of th« government or by sorae other specially 'If'Sl c^ netpd 
representative. 
3« The Security Council may hold meetlngR at such olar«s oth^-
t^an the seat of the Org^ilsallon as \t\ Itr judgment V«llf best 
f a c i l i t a t e Ite «K>rk. 
Article 29 
The Security round 1 may establish such subsldlrry or-^^s a^  ! t 
dent necessary for the perform^^ice of i t s functions* 
Article ^j 
The ?««curlty Council shall ^^opt ft? own rules '^ f pr'>c'^'*ure,^rc''idlno 
tht< method of 8el(»ctlng I t s P'-esl^ert. 
Article 31 
finy IKeaiber of th. United Nations which i s not a member '>f the 
Security Council may participate, without vote* in the dlsrussl jn of 
any cfuestlon brought before the Security Council whenever the 
l a t t e r consideres that the Interests of th«t Member are sr^eclally 
affscted* 
Article 32 
PriY Wsfcber of the United Nations which i s n-^ t a m-siRocr of the ""^ c^urity 
Council or any State v^lch Is not a Member of tite Un ted Nations, 
i f i t i s a party to a dlsp)ute under con'-l'^er^tl'^n by th© Security 
Counrllf ^ a l l be Invited to participate* without vote , In the 
discussion relating to the dispute. The Security rcuncll shall lay 
down such cwJdltlons as I t d< ems just for th pert*-io^tIon of a 
State which i s not a Member of the tjn .ted Natlsrs. 
CH/^ PTEPVI. PATTFIC SETTte^^^T OF DTf-^ 'TTH* 
Article 33 
1. The partiss to aiy dlsnuto, th^ contlnuc-nrc of whch Is Ukely 
to endanger the malntenancj of Intent-tlonal rteaee ^^ ^ «»ctrrlty, «h?l1, 
f i r s t of a l l , s*dt a s o l t l o n by negotiation, ennulry, medlat^or', 
conci l ia t ion , arbitration, judlcit^l settl«=tB«»nt, resort t-^  * of-'^ '^l 
agencies or arrangements, or othsr nrar^ f^Ml raans of th^^r owi 
rhoice* 
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2* rh« Security Council th«ll« vihan i t d««it necessary, cal l uron 
tho parties to s e t t l t t h . t r dlsput* by such n^ans. 
Artlcl* 34 
The Security Council a«y Invettlgate any dispute, or any siUiatlo 
«hlch might lead to international frict ion or give rl'^e to a dlsnute. 
in order to datezmln* whtther the contlnuamsa of the dlsnute or 
situation Is l ike ly to endanger the maintenance of international 
p99ce and security. 
Article 35 
! • ^ y Meeibar of the tftilted Wations way bring any -lis ut--, c eny 
situation of the na'ure referred to in Article 34, to th^ attention 
of th«? !=^ecurity ^-uncll or of the Cenersl A8«etnbly. 
?. « ^tat9 which i s not a ^^ *mber of th** 'Jhited Mstl^n* rsy bri^q 
to the attent i '^ of the Security Council or of th» rencral f*,^Qmb^y 
any dispute to wh'ch i t Is a party if i t accepts in advanre, for th» 
purposes of th<3 dispute, the ^ l i o a t l o n s of pacific sf^ttlement 
provided In the present rharter. 
3« The proceedings of tha General As9eiti>ly in respect of matt.^r* 
brought to i t s attention undr thl« Artlcla wil l b« subject to th 
provisions of Articles 11 an I 12* 
Article 36 
1. Th* Security council may, at any stago cf : dls- ut(» f the nature 
rtftrred to In Article 33 or of a situation of l ike nature, rQcorHmen-^ ed 
appropriate procedures or laethods of adjustment* 
2. The Security council should take Into consideration any 
procedures for tho ss t t laeent of the dispute Mhlch have already b'^ en 
adopted by the part ies . 
3 . Tn making roco'nffian'iatlnns under this Article th^ a ^ e c u l t y Council 
^ould also take Into consideration ^ a t legal disputes should as a 
Scneral rule bo referred by the parties to the Interna tl'^^al ''^ ourt 'f tistlc^ in arcor^pnce vdth th^ provisions of thp Statute cf th© C'^irt. 
Art!ci#» rr 
1. Should the parties to a dlsnu'e of th? na ure r«»fer*^H to In 
Article 33 fa i l to s a t t l e i t toy the ms^&ns Indieatad In that Artirlp, 
they shall r«»fer I t to the ??ecurlty rouncll . 
2» t f th<? Security Council d(»eiBS th^t th<» cmtinuanrp of the dienute 
Is In fact l ikely to endanger th« weintenanc* of lnt-'m.3tlor>al nr^ncc^ 
and security. It shall decide *<hether to takr e r f on under Article 16 
or to recowB^nd such terms of settlement I'S i t way -'onsHer eporoi^rie-P, 
ii 
Article 3B 
^thout prejudle« to tho provisions of Artid»« 33 to 37, the Security 
Council sisy. i f alt the parties to my dispute so request, mike 
r^comnefidatlons to the parties Idth a visw to a pacific sattlemeot 
of the ditpute* 
CHATTLT? VII. AfTTm WTO ^PSp^CT TO THREAT^  TO THE T^HATE, l?»BAfHH^  
(3P TH>* P^NTK, mr> ATT*? OF AOG'^ FS'^ tCH. 
Article 39 
The Security Cooneil shall determine the existence ^1 any threet to 
the peace, breech of th^ pffrm, or act of aqQr«!Silon »n6 shall T»ake 
r^cf^-nmendlatlons, or deride what meesures shall be trten in acco^'iance 
mith Articles 41 9n6 42, to maintain or restore intern. t l M l p^are 
and security* 
Article 40 
in ord r to prov^it an aggravation of the s i tuat ion, th^ ^ r^ecurlty 
Coimcll May, before siakinq the rec<y»endatlons or deciding upcn the 
neasures provided for in Aiticli) 39, ca l l upon thb parties roncemed 
to comply with such provisional neasures as i t deeais necessary or 
desirable* Such provisional measures shall be «dthout prejudice to the 
r ights , c la ias or position of the parties concerned. The Security 
Council snail duly take account of fMlure to con ly v«'ih «urh 
provisiorsl measures* 
Article 41 
The Security Council nay decide %«hat measures not Involvlnts th? I'^ e 
of arsied force are to be emnloyed to give effect to i t s -'rclsi'-f>8, 
and i t way ca l l ur^ on the Member** of the HnHed Natl'ws to apply sueh 
ifsea«jre?. The*e fray Irclude cormlete or partial I'^tf-rm^tl n of orinowir 
relations and of r*iil, sea, a i r , posta l , teleqra^hlci ra'^lo en'*, othf^r 
neans of rcmmunlcatlon, an<^  the soverenee of dl^lowatlr -^elation*!. 
Article 49 
Sho'ld the Security Councl consider that measures nrcvlr*©'' for i'-
Article 41 would be Inadequate or have proved to be Inadeouate, i t r»ay 
take such action by a ir , sea, or land forces as may be nece*' ryto 
maintain or ripstore International pc>ace m%6 security. Snrh act^*^ may 
Include demonstrations, blockade, and other aerat ions by air , s«*a, 
or land lorces of Msnbers of th« United Nations. 
Article 43 
1* All a^esibers of the United Matlons, In order to cf>ntrlbutp t? 
the maintenance cf lnteni< tional peace and security, undertake to make 
availaole to the Security Council, e4« i t s ca l l and in acordanre viri ch 
a special agreeaient or »qr enents, araied forces, a s^ stance ani 
f a c i l i t i e s , including rights of passsge, nec*ssdry for th i>ir os *. of 
maintaining international peace snd security. 
S2 
3« Such •^r99^9mt or «9r«tmMltt i^all Qovem the number« ant* 
typ*^ of forces, Iht lr <!«9T«e of ro«(!in«s« *iff ^imortl loratlonfe 
and th» nature of the f a e l l i t i e t and assistanre to be provided, 
3. The agraatiMmt or a^reeiatfits shall be negotiated at soon a« 
ootslbla on the tn l t ia t tve of the Saeurfty rouncll . They shall be 
concluded b '^ttiaan ttie Security Council an^ ^ Vewberji or betw <»n th* 
Saeurtty Council and oroups of Kambars and shall be subject to 
rat i f irat lon by the signatory States in accord;«)re with th*lr respective? 
constitutional processes* 
Article 44 
<^ enth^ > Security rouncll has decided to use force i t s i ia l l , before 
cal l lnc upon a Meoiber not rapresent«-d on i t to nrovlde armed forces 
m fulHlmeni of thu obligations assuoied under Article 43, invite 
that V.ember» i f the Menber so desires* to partlcipa«;« In th. dcclsior>« 
of the Security Council concerning the astploysient of contin;jent8 of 
that Manbsr's araied forres* 
Article 45 
In order to enabla the United Nations to take uroent military measures» 
Msnbsrs shall hold iTnedlat ely available national alr.forco contnoents 
for combined international enforcement action. Th« strenoth nd 
degree of r<? Hlnes' of these corttlngf»nt« anrf nl an§ for t h ' l r roirblned 
action shall be detannlned, '•within the l imits l e H Hov«n in tha nori-:! 
agreement or agreements referred to in Arttrle 43, by the ' scurttv 
Counc I with the asA stance of the wii l tary Staff Conro'tte©, 
Article 46 
Plans for th*? application of armed fo ce shall be made by the ??«=>eurity 
Council with the assistance of ths " i l l tary Staff C'>'*m»tt»e. 
Article 47 
1. There shall be established a fHlitary Staff Cof!«^tte«» to a-!viee 
and ass i s t the Security Coixncil f^ n al l guestlons relatinq to the 
Security Cotmcll's military requirements for the mainten nca of 
international peace an^ security, the amnloyment ani command of force's 
placed at i t s disposal, the regulation of ansacents, n^-f -possible 
disatsastent* 
2* Th« Military Staff ComUtae shall consist of th^ - chiefs of 
Staff of the pamanent members of the Security Council or thslr 
representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not pemivn^ntly 
represented on tiia Coonaittea shall be invited by the Coromittee to be 
associated with I t whan the ef f ic ient discharge of the Committee's 
responsibi l i t ios requires the participation of that Member in i t s writ . 
3 . The Military Staff Conralttpe shalJ bs re^jonslbla under tb 
Security rouncll for the strategic direction of any azm«d lorc<5s 
placed at the disposal of the Security roiaici l . Questions relatinq to 
the comrrand of such forces shall be woTi(4ld out subsequently. 
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4« The Mlllt«ry St f f Comm ttee» with the authorisation of the 
Security Counell mS after consul tat! on with ^proprlat« rerlonal 
aoonelas, may establish regional 8ub»con«eittaes. 
Article 48 
1. The aetlon requlra<t to carry out the decisions of th^ *'>erurlty 
Counell for the nalnt«nance of International peace and security •haH 
be t<^en by all the Veeibtrs of the 'Jhlted Wettons or by sone of th«»m, 
as the Security Council may deteiiEina* 
2* Such decisions shall be carried out by the Wenbers of the ^>U»d 
Nations direct ly and throi»^ their ect!on *n tha appronUAa Int^^-
natio^al aoendes of i*ich they are members. 
Article 49 
The Members of the United Nations shall Join In af:ordlnq mutual 
ass is tmca in carrying out the measures decided upon by the SecuXlty 
Council* 
Article 5u 
If preventive or enforcaoMint measures aQainst 9ny *^ tatr> ar9> taker, by 
the Security council* any other State, *(hethf?r a Member jf tho 'JnUed 
Nations or not, which iirids i t s e l l confront*'? with sped 1 oconcrric 
problems arlelng from the carryln- out of those measur?? shall hs\ 
the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a sc l - t lon 
of these problems. 
Article 91 
Nothing In th« pre«(ent Charter shall In^air th^ Inherent rlaht -^ f 
Individual or co l lec t ive sel f.defmce If an anaedl attacked cfurs a Inst 
a Mwber of the Un'ted Nations, until the Security r-tJt!incll has t?kan 
measures necessf'Ty to maintain int?TnAtional peace end security. 
Measures t k e n by Membe"^  in the exercise of this ri,nht of •elf-'i^fence 
shall be Immediately r-T>ort«»d to the Security Council anl "".han n-^ t in 
any way affect the authority and resDonslbillty of the Security 
Council under th? pre«Mit Charter to iske at any tfra? surh action -^s 
i t deems necessary <n order to »"sintain orr restore int^-^atlnnal 
peace ani security. 
Article 5P 
1. Nothing In th-' present Charter precludes the existence -f 
reolonal arrangements or agencies for deallno with su'^ h :?atter«: 
relating to the maintenance of International p?ace and •^rcu'-ity as 
are approorlata for regional actlorjjj provided that 'u-h arran'=»ff»onts 
or acencies and their ac t iv i t i e s are consistent with th^ Purposes =ini 
Principles of the United Nations. 
84 
?. The Menbers of the Un'ttd Nations cnteririQ Into «urh arranot^m^nts 
or const'tutlng such ao«ncl9« th«ll rnaks «very effort to «chleve 
pacific ttttl«tRcnt of local dltputot throuch such roqlonal arranrP?^pnts 
or by »u«*h reolonal tQancios bafora r^farHn^ th«e to tha <:^curity 
roimeU* 
3. The Saeurlty Council shall anrours'ia th*» d<»v«lopwant of parM^t 
sattlemant of local disputes through »ud» r9g!<^al arranft»»jv>nts 
or by tuch raolonal aganclas «lth«r on the In i t ia t ive of th^ '^ tat'^ * 
concerned or by reference froi th^ Security Tounell. 
4 . This Article In no wav le|>alrs the application nf Art! IQR 
34 and 3A. 
Article 53 
i . The Security Council shall» nhere apprt^rlate, u t m x o such 
regional arrangements or agencies for enforeement action under I t s 
authority* But no enforcement action shall be t.iken under nofo^al 
azranqenents or by regional agencies without tha authorlEetion of the 
r>ecurlty Council* with the exception of neasures against any ene^ -y 
State, as deflnad In paragraph 2 of this Artic le , provided for 
pursuant to Article 107 or In rev^lo al arranc oments direr t«d agSilnst 
ren&wdl of agoresslve ool lry un the part of any surh '^tate, until 
such time as tho Organization laay, on request f th. ^'jve n nts 
concerned, be charged wiih the re uonslbl l i ty for prev'>nt!no fu 'T'.CT 
aggresslcn by su'h a 5ta%a« 
2. The tarn *anar««y State* as used m paragraoh I of this /vrtirle 
anpltes to any J^tate w*»lch during the Second t^^rld War ha*^  been r 
enersy of any signatory of the presen' Charter. 
Article 54 
The Tecurlty council shall at all times be keot futly infonre'' »f 
aetWltiesi undertaken or In corterplat!on under rpo''on<Pl »r»etnofrs>nt< 
or by regloral agencies for the maintenance of Int^ t»at*rr<«i nrare 
and security* 
n-IAPTEf' IX. T^ Tri^ ArT'-''*'AL iT^rCPTr VWr '^ 'YT'I. (T.r-r^;Tr'^' 
Article 55 
With a vl«w to th«^  creation of conditions of s t s b ' l l t y and *ll-.b«»1m 
which ara necessary for peaceful and friendly reletscfts ar m nations 
based on respect for the principle of eoucl rights and self.determina-
tion of peoples, the United Nations shall promote; 
(a) higher stdOdar^s of l i v ing , full eanployrrent, an^ :»iditl:sns 
of economic «rjH s o d 1 oro'^ress end developTtent; 
(b) solutions of International econc^lc, soc ia l , heelth, an'l 
related probleoiS} and Intematlonsl cultural anc^  aiucm^nal 
cob.op«ration| and 
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(c) unlvt'^tal respect for, af»' '^b«•^vane9 of, human l iqhts art'* 
fundamtntal fr'edomt for all without dist inction an to race, 
sax* language, or religion* 
Article 56 
All Mambars pledge theaselves to take jc lnt and separ t e "tctlon In 
cooperation with the Organization for th-» achlevf»^ent of th' nupposes 
set forth In Article 5tt. 
Article 57 
!• Tne various special ised aoencles, established by Intec-govemffientdl 
•greement and having vdde lnt@xnatlonal respons ib i l i t i e s , es define'^ 
In their b a l e Instrunenls, In eranamlc» social* cultural , e^cdt lonal , 
health, ifid related f i e l d s , shall be brought Into relationship with 
the UnUed Nations In accordance with the provisions of Artlrle 6?* 
9. Such agencies thus brought Into relatlonehlp with tho t'n!t(>H 
Nations are hereinafter referred to at specialised agencies. 
Article 5« 
The Organisation shall mMce reroninendatlons for the eo-ord1netiof> '^ f 
the po l i c i e s and ac t iv i t i e s of the* spvelal'sed aaoncle*. 
Article 59 
The Organisationshall, where aop'-oprlate. In i t ia te neo'^tfati'^s a»r««o 
the States eoncertied for th© rreatlon of any n«»w speclnl'sed aoencie^ 
required for \h& aero«r'llshf»ent of ttie purT<oses s«^ t forth in Article 5^. 
Article 60 
Besponslblllty for the ilscharoe of th** functi'-ns of ihe Ornanisat'on 
set forth In ttils Chapter «hall be vested In the Generdl Assembly,and, 
tmdar the authority of the General Assembly, lit the ^ironcsilc and 
S*cl«^l Council» which shall have for th i s purpose the powers set forth 
In Chapter X. 
Oi/»PTEP. X. THE BCCMCMIC /ND SOCI/4. COWnL 
foepotltlon 
Article 61 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of twenty.seven 
Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly. 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, nln© member* of the 
Economic and S-^clal Co-ncll shall be alerted each year for a t^m of 
three y^ars, f retiring luember shall be e l ig ib le for i'nmedlati* 
rewelectfon. 
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3* At the f i r s t f lect ion after (*»• Increase In the membership 
of the Economle end Soclr^l Council fron elghtetfi to twenty-seven 
nenberst in a-idltlon to th« nerebers elected in place of the six 
menbers whose tens of off ice expires at the end of that ye£r« nine 
•Jdltlcnal ttenbtrs shall be alerted. Of these nire additional sBeo^bers, 
the t e m of o f f ice of three neoibers so elected shall eynira at the 
end of one y ar, and of three othe* «e»be s at the end of tv»o y ars, 
in accordance with arrangements roarte by the Genef-al /'ssembly-
4 . Earh mesber of the Economic and r o d a l Council shall have one 
represent atlve 3 
Functions and Powers 
Artlcls 6? 
1. The Econorale and Social rouncU may m^e>. or ln! t la t? stuHlle«; an'' 
report* with r^spert to International economic, soc ia l , cuUu-^al, 
eduratlona, health, and related matters and r^ ay tn i^te r-^rom-'n-'c'tl i^ " 
with respect to any surh matters to the General Assembly, tc the 
Members of th«» IM!ted Nations, and to the specialised aqenclP'S conr«''-n '^<. 
2» I t may mAe r«conw«endations for th* purpose cf ororaotlntj resp ct 
for , -*nd observance of, human rlehts ani fundamental fr*»e'<'fns fo-^  a l t . 
3 . I t may prepare draft conventions for sul^isst'-n to th.- Gt^nerl 
Assembly, with respect to natters fa l l ing within I t s conpatenca. 
4 , I t may c a l l , in accordance with the rules p escribed by the 
Un ted Nations, Inteznatlonal conferences on matters fa l l lno within 
I ts competence* 
a r t i c l e *3 
1. The Econoalc and Social rouncll may enter Into agre^a-nt* %vlth 
any of the agencies referred to In Article 37, defining the t it»s 
on wrtilch the agency concerned shall be brought into relatlsjnship 
with the United ^rations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval 
by the €eneral ^ssnbly* 
?, f t may co-ordinate tho ac t iv i t i e s of the sp'»c1sllzed aiencle*? 
through ccM^sultatlon with and rec omm en da t l m s to surh a-enries n^-^  
through reconnendati^ s to the General Assennly and to th** M f^^ ber* '^ f 
the united Nations. 
1 . As amandad* The original text of Article ?7 reads j>s follows:-
1. The 'iconofnlc im'l S'->clal touncH shall consist of eighteen M©n*>#rs.. 
2* ^ubjact to the provisions of paragranh 3 , six members "^  th(» 
Economic amd Social rouncll shall be elected each year for a 
term of three years* A retiring member shall be e l ig ib le for 
immediate rif-election* 
3* At the f i r s t e l ec t ion , eighteen members of the Economic and 
Social CCHiocil shall be chosen* The term office of six m^i^ars 
so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and of six other 
oianbars at the end of two years . . . . 
4 . Each namber of the isconomlc and Social Council shall be one 
repre«: ent atlva •" 
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Artiel9 64 
1* Th« Eeenonie «nd Social Council may trka aopTopriat^ steps 
to obtain ra^ular raoortt from the special!tad agencies. I t may rr^ akp 
arranoements Mth ttia Wanbars of the tJhltad nations an^ l with the 
speclal i tad a<9eneies to obtain reports on the steps taken t'Msive 
affect to I t s om reeomBandati-na mtf^ to recanman-^ations on watt«»rs 
fa l l ing «dthin Ita eoa^at^^ce siada by the Genarol Asseirbly. 
2 . I t may coRraimlcate i t s observations on thene re-^orte to th> 
Gonaral ASsanbly. 
Article 65 
The Economic end Soci . l Council may furnish Informetlon to the 
Security Council and shall ass i s t the Security Council upon i t s 
r«qu«st* 
Article 66 
1* Th^ Econcnic and Social Council shall parforr. surh functi n? 
as fa l l vdthin Its competence in connexion «dth thr^  carrying out of th*^ ' 
riicofnmendations of the Genatcl Assasibly* 
2« I t may, with the cpprovsl of the Caneril Assem;ly, pcrforB 
services at th(» recuest of Manbars of the United ^^atlcns and at the 
recniest of i^necialized agencies. 
3 . Tt shall parfozm tuch other functloni? as are specified elsetehere 
in the present Charter or as «ey ba as-^icmed to i t by the C-'neeal 
Assembly* 
Vltinq 
Article 67 
1. Each member of the Economic an'' ?^oci?l C«unc!T «h;»n have '^e 
vote* 
2. Decision df the Economic ani Sodlal Cornell shall be made by 
a majority of tho members present and votinq. 
Procedure 
Article 68 
The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in econon^lc 
and s o c i l f i e lds 4nd for tha promotion of human r ic^ts , mri surh 
other caamlasions as at&y be required for the perfozmance -^ i i t s 
functions* 
Article 69 
The bconomic and Social Council shall invite any Wefrber rf th» 'ttlted 
Nations to participate, without vote . In I t s dellberaLlons on the 
matter of particular concern to that ¥,embar* 
9« 
Artlcl* 70 
Article 71 
The Eeonoaic md Social Counell say make tvjltable arrano^ents for 
consultation with nonv^ovamieental organisations «ihieh are cjncpm*^ 
w l ^ Blatters within i t s competence*. 
Such arrant^ eiR^nts may be wade with lnte]ti£>tional org^nlzatl ns en-i, 
where apprc^rlate, with national organizations after consutatlon 
with the Members of the United Nations conremed* 
Article 7? 
1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt Its ovn rules cf 
procedure, including the method of selecting Its President. 
2. The Economic strvi Social Council shall mejt cs rcqulrei In 
accordance with i ts rules, which shall inrlude orovl I n s for tht 
convHting of naetings on th« request of a majority of i t s raembars. 
cnppT^yj, n=ctA»»AT'nM rr5GA«»i'TNG M W - S =Lr crvB^^im r-^^'^rrrtss 
Article 73 
Mcabors of Ute United Natl'^nt «^!rh have or assume responsibilities 
for the admlnlstr^tlrsn of territories whose peoples have n->t yet 
attained a full measure of self.gove^twnent recognise the prlnciole 
that the Interests of th:^  Inhabitants '>f these terrltoH©*; are par mount, 
and accept as ? sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utwft^, 
within tnc system of Intematl nal peace wi security establlshe-« by 
the present Charter, the well-bslng of th? Inhabitants of the*c 
territories, and to this tnd« 
(a) to ensure, with due respect for th? cultur of tho paoples 
concexnad, their pol i t ical , aconcAlc, toc lc l , md educdtlonal 
advaneemant» their just treatment, « d their protection aqdlnst 
abusts; 
(b) to develop self-government, to talce due account of tha political 
aspirations of tha peq^les, and to assist them in th proqrcs*^ Ive 
development of their free political Institutions, acror^lng to 
the particular circumstances of each territory and i t s oeoples 
and their varying stages of advancementj 
(c) to further Intewstlonal peace and security; 
(d> to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage 
research, and to co-oporate with one another artfi, «chen and vthere 
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approprlata,with •peclalLtad intafnatlonal bodies with & 
view to the practical <iehl«v*m«nt of the s o c i l . econnmlc, 
md sc ient i f i c pmpo»m9 »«t forth in this Artif;i»« an-* 
(•) to transalt r e ^ l a r l y to the $«cr«tary«Gfln»ral for lnfon»atlor 
purpotost subjoet to such l ln l tat lon «a aaeurlty anr« 
constitutional conatdaratlons may racrulre, s t a t i s t i c a l and 
othar Inforaiatlon of a tethnlcal nature relattnq to eccnoRiic, 
soc ia l , and adueatlonal conditions In tha terr i tor ies for 
which they ara raspactlvaly raiponslbla othar t h ^ those 
tarrltorias to which Chapters Xi l and XITt apply. 
Article 74 
Monbars of the united Nations also aoree that ttiefr rjollry <n ra«pect 
of tha territories to which this Chapter applies , no les^ t^an In 
respect of tt»*ir netronolitan a^ea«>, imist be based n^ the 'jen^r 1 
p r i n d o l e of <|ood nel<|hbourlines«t, tiif account baino tak^n of th 
interests and welL»bain9 of tha rast of thff world, In soc ia l , ^c^^-^'Cf 
and commercial natters . 
CHAPTER XII. Prr£«»lATir'TAL TWUSTHESHTP Syrrm 
Article 75 
The United Nations shall establish under I t s authority an international 
trusteeship systan for tha adnlnistratlon and supervision of surh 
terr i tor ies as Bdy be placed thereimder by subsequent i'^dividual 
agreements. Thesj t r r l t o r l e s are hereinafter referred to a- tru«t 
t err i tor i e s . 
Article 76 
The basic objectives of tha trusteeship system, in acrordanca with 
the Purposes oi the United Nations laid down in Article 1 cf th^ 
present rhart*:ir, shall be*. 
(a) to further Intarnatl^al peace and saculrlty* 
(b) to proBOte the p o l i t i c a l , economic, soc ia l , and ef^ ur t^of^al 
advancasient of the InhaMtants of the trust t e r r i t o r i e s , an''* 
their pro9resslve development towards self-qovemmant or 
independence M nay be approorlate to the particular cireuns. 
tances of each territory and I ts peoples and th» freely 
expressed wishes of the oeople concerned, mri a« T»y bf 
provided by the tatsis of each truateethip aorea»fteT»t; 
(c) to enc<Hiraoe respect for huaian rights and for fund«»fi*»ntal 
freedoas for al l without dist inct ion as to race* sax, lanoua-?, 
or r*jligion, and to ancourane recognition of th» tr-tardependenea 
of thr^  peoples of the workd; md 
(d) to ensure acpjal traatmant in soc ia l , econonic and comnierci^t 
natters for a l l Menbers of tha United fSaticns and their 
90 
fiAtlo'^Alt, «id «lto eqaal tr«atm«nt for lh*> l« t t«r \n the 
•d!Binittr«t!on of j t t t l icc , without pr»judice to the attalnw^nt 
of tha foregoing objectives and subject to th» nrovlslons of 
Artlf le SO. 
Article 77 
1. The trusteeship systew shell epply to such terr i tor ies In the 
following eeteqorles as way be pieced thereun'ler by m: ans of 
trusteeship agrewients: 
(3 t<»rritories now h**!-* under ipandste; 
(b) terr i tor ies which way b« detached from eneny «!tates a* a rp^ult 
of the Serond World war; and 
(c) terri tories voluntarily placed under the systera of States 
re^ons lb le for their adR>ln1strfitl<x>. 
2* I t wil l be a matter for subsciou^nt agref'ment as to which 
terr i tor ies In the foregoing r.t'tegorles wi l l be brought und«^ >r the 
trusteeship systen and upon «hat terns* 
Article 78 
The trusteeship systen shall not apply to terr i tor ies wh c^h have 
ba. one Cambers of the United Nation*, relationship mnr.q wh c^h »»^-U 
be based m respect for th^ principle of Fovereicn ©ouailty. 
Article 79 
The teres of trusteeship for each territory to be plac(>d und-^ r th-» 
trusteeship system, including any alteration o^ anenHtaent, shall be 
•greed upon by the States dlrsst ly coneerne'l, Includlno th^ mdndrtory 
power in the ca5« of terr i tor ies field unflor siandate by a v^ber '^ f 
th9 Ifnit'ed Nations, end shall be «T>prov©^ as p'-ovide-^ for 5n Artlrles 
83 ani S5. 
Article 80 
1. EKc^pt as way b<» agreed upon In individual trust<?'»«hip agr^^'ipent*, 
siade under Articles 77, 79» an^ 81 , placing each territory under tho 
t rus tee^ ip system, and until surh agreenents have been concluded, 
nothing In this Chaoter shall be construed in or of l t «e l f to alter 
in any manner the rights »4)«tsovsr of any States or m>y peoples or 
the t«zsi8 oi enlstlno Intexnatlonal Instruaents to vthlch vewber« -f 
the United Nations nay respectively be parties . 
2* Psragraph 1 of this Article shall not be Interpreted as Mvim 
orounds for delay or postponement of th- neqotlatlnn and ronclus'-n 
of Sfreeffiients for placing nsndated and other terri tories under ths 
trusteeship systen as provided for in Article 77* 
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Artlcl« 81 
Th« trutt««thip «gre«r.«nt th^U tn mmh case include ^ e tezois una«^ 
vihleh the trust territory wU^ be edmlnietered and detlgnete th<> 
authority whlcti wi l l exercise the adailntctr<-?tion of th? trust 
terri tory. Such authority, hereinafter called the ^dmlnltterlng 
auth^^rlty, may be one or nore States or the Organ!satlon l t«0 l f . 
Article S2 
There may be deslrnated* in any trusteeshio aoreement, a strate'oir 
area or areas %9h^  rh may Include part or al l of the trust territ^^rv 
to wh*ch the aoreement appllest wdthout prejudlr« to any sf>«»Hl^ l 
agreement or a^fseraents aada unier Article 43. 
Article 83 
1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas. 
Including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agre .'fr.ents and 
of their alteration or «sendment, shall be eyercl^ed by th^ * e^cur^ lty 
Council. 
2. The basic objectives se t forth In Article 76 sh 11 be applicable 
to the people of each strategic area* 
3. The Security Council ^ a l l , subject to th^ ^ provisl ns of the 
trusteeship agreements and w i t h o t prejudice to security consider6tions, 
avail I t s e l f of the assistance of tho Trusteeship Council tu perfcr 
those fimctlons of the United Nations under the trusteesnip systr>(r 
relating to p o l i t i c a l , economic, soc ia l , and educational metiers In 
the strategic areas. 
Article 84 
I t shall bs the duty of the actodnlstaring authority to ensure that 
the t m s t territory shall play I t s part In the maintenance of 1nt(>r. 
national peace and security. To this end the a<^mlnlsterlnf» authority 
may make use of volunteer forces , f a c i l i t i e s , ^tnJ esslstanr? irom the 
trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the *Jprurity 
Council undertdten In this regard by the admin 1sterlnc authority, e* 
well as for loc'I defence md the maintenance of lew end o^ -^ e*- *4*:h<n 
the trust territory. 
Article 85 
1. The functions of the Un'ted Nations with regard to troste»«blo 
agreements for all areas not deiloiated as s trategic , lncl«'d1no th^ 
approv il of the torms of the trusteeship agreens«nis ^d ot heir 
alteratlnn or amendm«rit, shall be exercised by the Generill A*:sembly. 
2« The TrusteeshlD Council, operating under the authority of th? 
General Assembly, shall ass is t the General Assembly in carrylnr, -nt 
these functions. 
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rWAPTBR X m . THE TWJSTERSHTP COUNCIL 
Cmpotltion 
Artlel* 86 
X* The TnJtt««shtp Council shall eontlnt of the foUowinq ««€fnbors 
6! th« Unittd Nationst 
(a) thota IWflfRbars adnlnittartnQ trust torri torUs* 
(b) Mch of thosa Manbors mentlonad by n«M !n Artlrle ^ as ar^ 
not admlnlttarlnf trust tarri tortasj and 
(c) as many othar Mavbara aleeted for thrae^yaar terras by the 
Gonaral .Aa«arebly as may be necdss«ry to ensure that tha total 
nwBbar of maitbars of tna Trust»eship Council Is dqually divided 
batwaan thosa Maabars of tha Unitad Nations tihirh administer 
trust tarritorlas and thosa which do not. 
7* Each nambar of tha Tnist«»ship council shall designate one" 
tpacial ly quallfiad person to rf^presant It therein. 
Funetleant and Powars 
Article 87 
Tha Ganoral Assssibly and* under i t s authority, th TrustaeAir> ''O'.ncll, 
in carrying out their functions, may: 
(a) consider reports submUted by the aHwinittering authority; 
(b) accept pet i t ions and ex<«)ina then in consul ta t ' (^ %^ tth the 
adminittering authority; 
(c) provide for periodic v i s i t s to the respective trust terr i tor ies 
at tienes aoreed unon with the administering authority* and 
(d) take these and other actions In conformity with th^ t^ms -»f 
the trusteeship agreements* 
Article 89 
The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the 
po l i t i ca l f economic» soc ia l , and educational advencersent of the 
inhabitants of each trust terr i tory, and the adminiaterinq authority 
for each trust territory idthin the competence of th? General As<iembly 
shell make an Minual report to tha General Assembly upon the ba4 s of 
turh questionnaire. 
Votinq 
Article 89 
1. Bach member of the Trusteeship council shall have joe vote. 
2 . Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majtrity 
of the members present end voting. 
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Proc«dur« 
ArtieU 90 
1* Til* Trusteeship Council shall sdopt i t s (Mm rulss of proee^ure. 
Including the nsthod of se lset lng I ts Prssidant* 
2. The Tmstssshlp Council shall noet ss required In accordsnre 
wlthi i t s rulos« i^ildn shall include provision for the convf^ninQ of 
neetinqs on the request of a najorlty of i t s nembers* 
Article 91 
The Trusteeship Council shall* vnhen appropriate, avail i t s e l f of the 
assistance of tho Economic and Sod el Council and of th? SQ»C1 I5 7.ed 
agencies In regard to matters with «(hlch they are respertlvsly 
concemad. 
CHAPTER XIV. THE INTEPNAIIONAL CC^JRT F^ JUSTICE 
Article 92 
Th* tntemat imal Court of Justice shall ba the principal Ju He! at 
orqan of the IMtted Nations. Tt shall function tn aceordenrs with tho 
annexed Statute, which i s based uoon the Statute of the '^ersianent 
C'^ urt of Tntexfiatlonal Justice ani fizsis m integral part of th^ 
present rharter. 
Article 93 
1* All tfesbers of th» United Nations are ipso facto oarties to the 
Statute of the International Court of Just ice , 
2* A State which i s not a MeirtM»r of the United Neticns may berome a 
party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice en conditions 
to ba daterminad in each c a e by the Genar?l Assembly unon the 
recoBKdendation of the Security Council* 
Article 94 
1. Each Meober of the lAnlted Nations undertakes to coa^ly with the 
dacis l n of the Intetnaiional Court of Justice in any case to which 
i t i s a party. 
2 . If any party to a case f a l l s to perfoiro the obligations Incumbent 
upon i t under a jud^nent rendered by the court, the nther party ray 
have recourse to tf\p Security Council, which way. If 1* -feefts n^rrss ry, 
mMte recornmendatinns or decide upon measures to be trken to give 
effect to the judgc>mcnt« 
Article 95 
Nothing in th«» present chartar sh?ll nrevent Ws-nbers of th^ ''n!tei 
Naticms fr<» entrusting the solution of th?ir difference's to other 
tribunals by virtue of agreements alrea-!y In existence or which r,ry 
be concluded In thp future. 
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Artlcl* 96 
i* Th« General Asstntoly or the Security Council may requ st tha 
Int«>xn£tl^«l Court of Justice to give an advisory Ofjlnlon onany 
legal qutrStlon. 
2. Other organa of the 'Jnltad Nations and spacl^llzed agencies, 
#)lch may at any tine ba so authortsad by the General ASfambly, may 
also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questl'^nt arlslno 
within the scope of thd r a c t l c l t i e s . 
mfiprm xt« THE SEC^ETARI/T 
Article 97 
The Secr«<t:?riat shall comprise a *;ecr«?tary-Gfneral and such staff as 
ths Org^lzatlcffi may require. The Seeretery«Gen«ral shall be a^^lnted 
by the General AsseeiMy upon the recommendation of the Security 
Council. He shall be the chlsf 8'«mln1strative office- of tho 
Organ fixation. 
Article 96 
The Secretary-G. naral shall act In that capacity In a l l wet lnqs of 
the G neral Assesibly, of th@ Security Council* of th^ Bconomlc and 
Social Counell, and of th« Trusteeship Couneil* annt shall perform 
such other functions as are entrusted to l^ln by these organs. The 
Secretary-General shall mdie an annual report to the G<»nerrjl Assembly 
en the work of the Organisation. 
Article 99 
The Secret<:'ry-G'^e'al nay bring to tho attention of the Security 
Council any matter which In his opinion siey threaten the maintenance 
of International peace and security. 
Article 100 
1. In the DerfoxBianc of t h i i r duties the S ec re t a ry.G en a rid and 
the staff -Phsll not s e ^ or rec Ive Instiuctlons fro« any Govemin'-nt 
or frca any other authority external to the Organliatlon. They shall 
refrain froB any action which might ref lec t en their r o s i t i m as 
International o f f i c ia l s responsible only to the Orqanizatlon. 
% Each Meaber of the United Nations undertidtes to respect th^ 
exclusively International character of the resoonslbiHtle^ rf th? 
Secretary-Gi^neral and the staff «Tnd not to seek to Influence th'^ n 
in the discharge r^ f their refir^onsl b i l l t i e s . 
Article 101 
1« The »t9ff shall be »npoint»dl by th«* ?5»cr©t^rv-.Ceneral under 
regulations established by the G:^nerjl Assembly. 
2* Af)praprl«tt i t « f f t shall b% ptni«n«iitly «tslgncd to the 
EconoBle «ia Socisl Council» the Tfu«t«*shlp C<wneu» and, as re<iuire\ 
t o oth«r organs of tha Unittd Nations. Tha^e s taf f s shall foza a part 
of tha Sacretarlat* 
3 . Tha parfftoimt consldaration ititha vsploymant of the staff an-* 
In tha data^Bitoatlon of the conditions of service shall be th^ * 
necessity of securing the hlghost standards of affleloncy, conpetenre* 
«r)d Integrity* Due regard shall be paid to the lainortanc^ of remit t lno 
the s taf f on as sdde a geographical bssls as poss ible . 
CHA1>TBP KVI. »»ISCI1LL/WSDUS PVCVISI^^S 
Article 102 
1 . Every treaty and sfvery intematl't^al agreemffnt wf^tered Into by 
any lie«bsr of the United Nations after the present rharter comes 
Into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the 5>«eretarldt 
and published by I t . 
2. No party to any surh treaty or International agreen^ent which 
has not been registered in aerordifice with the provisions of paraorar^ 1 
of th is Article may Invoke that treaty out agreement before any oroan 
of the United Nations. 
Article 103 
In the event of a c<mfllct between the obligations of the Menbers of 
the United Nations und«r the present rharter and their obligations 
under any othar International agi^ement^ their obligations under the 
presMit Charter i^al l prevai l . 
Article 104 
Tha Organliatlon shall an joy In tha territory of each of I t s Members 
surh legal capacity as nay be necessary for the axarelse of I t s 
functions and the fulfllsient of I t s p^-rposos. 
Article 105 
1 . The Organisation shall enjoy in the territory of each of I t s 
IKeaib«rs surh privi leges and Imsunltlef ss are necessary for th^ 
fulf l lmmt of I t s nurposos. 
2. f>epre«en tat Ives of thi? Weiebers '^ f the united Matl'-ns anH of*^lr^al«t 
of the Organisation shall s l» l lar ly enjoy surh prlvlleejes an-* liwpur^ltles 
as are necessary for Vhe Indepen^tent exarelse of tt»elr funetl'^s In 
coimexlcm with the Organisation. 
3 . The General Assaoibly aay m«4te rerofflnsendatlons with a view tr 
detemlnlng the detai l s of the application of paragrenhs 1 anH *> of 
this Article or nay propose conventions to th» Members of the !¥\lte-jl 
Nations for this purpose. 
CHAPTEI^  XVIT. TP/y-'SinoWAL SBCtmTTY AW ANC r^ ^ W^T*? 
ArUrl«in6 
Pending the cooilnQ Into fore© of sufh spscl.^l aoroements reftfrrtd 
to In Artlcl* 43 M in ttit ooinlon of tn« Security Council i»n«bl* 
i t to b«Qin th« •xorels* of l t« responttbi l i t los under Article 47, 
the parties to the Four-^*etlon Deelaretfon, tlrned «t »'oscow, 
October 30» 1943, and France sha l l , in accordance with the pr^wl-il^s 
of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and 
as occasion requires with other Members of the IHifted ifatl-os with 
a view to such jo int action on behalf of the Organisation as may be 
necessary for Utc purpose of maintaining international peace and 
security. 
Article 107 
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, 
in relation to any State which during the Second World Wer has been 
an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized 
as a result of that war by the Govemf*'ents having responsibil i ty for 
such action* 
CHAPTER x v i i i . mmmmrs 
Article 108 
/mendsents to the present charter shall cone into force for allB'eR^e's 
of the United Nations sAien they have be«n adopted by a vote of two-
thirds of the nembsrs of the General Asseably and rat i f ied in 
accordance with their respective ^institutional processes by two. 
thirds of the Menbars of the United Nations, including all the 
pSTSianent siflinbars of the Security Council* 
Article 109 
1* A General Conferenco of the Mesibers of the United Natinr^s for 
the purpose of revlawlno the present Charter may be held at a date 
and plscs to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the m(»ffibers of the - ne^^l 
Asseaibly and by a vote of any seven nembsrs of th4» ^security council . 
Bach Meaiber of the United Nations shall have one vote in the ronf»'r«nc«». 
2* Any alteration of th ' present charter recQ«B«nded by a two.third<i 
vote of the conference shall take effect when rat i f ied in acror^^ance 
with their re^ec t ive constitutional processes by two.third<^ of the 
Members of the IMited Nat lone including al l the pennanent nutnber«; f^ 
the Security Council. 
3 . I f such a conference' has not been held before thv tenth annual 
session of th& General Asseaibly following the coning into force of the 
present Charter, the proposal to ca l l such a conference ^ d l l be 
placed on the Btumd* of that session of th£ General Asseaibly, and the 
conference shal l be held if so dscidad by a oiajority vote of the n'>cRbers 
of the General Assanbly and by a vote of any seven aieabers of the 
Security Coui^il* 
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CHAPTSU XIX. WATTFICATION /ND SimPJimS 
ArtlcUi 10 
!• Th« pr«s«nt Chaitr shall b« ratifltd bv the slonatory StiiUs 
In aecordanc* «dth ih«lr rsspectlv* conttltutlonal processes. 
2* Th« ratifications shall ba dapositad «dth the GcvernmAnt of 
tha Uhltad Statss of ABarlca» which shall notify all the signatory 
St at as of aach daposlt as wall as tha Sacratary-Gena^ al of tha 
Organisation whan ha has basn appointed* 
a. Tha prasent Chartar shall cona Into ferea upon tha Hepostt of 
ratifications by the Rtpubllc of China» France* tha Union of Sovlat 
Socialist napubllcs. tha Unitad Klnqdoii of Treat Britain ^d Mort^  rn 
Ireland^ m6 tha Unitad States of Amarlcay and by a majf^rity of 
tha other signatory ^ t^atas* A protocol of the ratlf iratl'^na i^nesitod 
shall th«»rMip<3n be -Ira**) up by the Governiaent of the Unite^ States 
of /swarica wh!ch shall coranunUdte copies thereof to all the sicin*tory 
States. 
4 . Tha States sionatory to the present rhartpr which r'»tlfy It 
after i t has caiRe into force will bacone original Menber« of the 
United Nations on the date of the deoosit of their ^evpectlv? 
ratifications. 
Article i n 
Tha present Chartar* of which th*^  rhinaset French, Russian, Fnqlish, 
and Spanish tests are e^fually authentic, shall remain deoosited in 
the archives of the Govanmant of the United States of Afierlca. Duly 
castifled copies thereof shall be transaitted by that Covemment to 
the Govarnnants of the other signatory States* 
In faith whareof tho representatives of the Governments nf tho 
UnUed Nations have signed the present Charter. 
Done at tha City of 3«n Francisco the twanty-sisth day of Jun«» 
cna thousand nine hundred and forty.fiva. 
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